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At the beginning of a new century, the American system of corporate governance finds itself in tumult. Propelled by genuine outrage
at abuses within companies like Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, Global
Crossing, and Adelphia, and by fear of being held accountable for
previous inaction, the federal government (through the Sarbanes-2
Oxley Act of 2002) and the nation's two largest Stock Exchanges
(through committee reports that will, subject to Securities and Ex-3
change Commission approval, generate new listing requirements)
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comments we received from John Coffee and other participants in this symposium as
well as the thoughtful input of John Finley, the Honorable Jack Jacobs, David Katz,
Victor Lewkow, Ted Mirvis, Eileen Nugent, and Robert Thompson about the effects of
the new reforms. We have based this Article on developments as of February 24, 2003
and have made no attempt to incorporate developments after that date.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.A., 15 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 28 U.S.C.A., 29 U.S.C.A. (West.
Sup. 2003)) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
We have capitalized the terms "Stock Exchange" and "Exchange" for the
reader's ease and use them to refer to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the
Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (NASDAQ). We have also capitalized the term "Exchange
Rules" to denote the rules promulgated by these Exchanges.
The key NYSE sources are:
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS AUGUST 1, 2002 (2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
corp-gov pro-b.pdf [hereinafter NYSE PROPOSED RULES]; N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT
OF THE NYSE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITIY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE

(2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-govreport.pdf [hereinafter NYSE
REPORT].
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have adopted important new initiatives designed to improve the integrity of corporate America-what we will call the 2002 Reforms.
Notably, the 2002 Reforms do not target only the core problems
that gave rise to some of the more publicized scandals, but instead
concentrate more generally on the manner in which public corporations should be governed. Indeed, one senses that it was easier for
Congress and the Stock Exchanges to gain consensus on this broader
corporate governance agenda than on measures that would (it can be
argued) more specifically redress some of the incentives that gave rise
to the past years' abuses. These include an obvious perception that
fast-and-loose accounting and expenditure practices would not be
easily detected nor prosecuted by federal and state governmental
authorities, weak accounting principles that gave corporations leeway
to engage in risky practices, and human greed tempted by perverse
accounting and tax rules that encouraged questionable compensation
arrangements. It is remarkable that neither Congress nor the Exchanges took action to rectify the perverse accounting
incentives that
4
now exist nowexit
for executive
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fr
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The NASDAQ sources are more scattered and include: SR-NASD-2002-141: Board
Independence and Independent Committees (proposed Oct. 9, 2002), reprinted as
amended in 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451 (Mar. 25, 2003); SR-NASD-2002-140: Shareholder
Approval for Stock Option Plans or Other Arrangements (proposed Oct. 9, 2002),
amended by Amendment No. 1 to Shareholder Approval for Stock Option Plans or
Other Arrangements (proposed Oct. 10, 2002), and reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 64,173
(Oct. 17, 2002); SR-NASD-2002-139: Adoption of a Code of Conduct for all Directors,
Officers, and Employees (proposed Oct. 9, 2002), amended by SR-NASD-2002-139:
Amendment No. I to Adoption of a Code of Conduct for all Directors, Officers, and
Employees (proposed Jan. 15, 2003), and reprinted in 68 Fed. Reg. 41,194 (July 10,
2003); SR-NASD-2002-138:
Disclosure of Exemptions by Non-U.S. Issuers from
Nasdaq's Corporate Governance Listing Standards (proposed Oct. 8, 2002), reprintedin
68 Fed. Reg. 41,193 (July 10, 2003); SR-NASD-2002-85: Issuer Disclosure of Material
Information (proposed June 26, 2002), reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 51,306 (Aug. 7, 2002);
SR-NASD-2002-80: Approval of Related Party Transactions (proposed June 11, 2002),
amended by SR-NASD-2002-80: Amendment No. 1 to Approval of Related Party Transactions (proposed Dec. 30, 2002), and reprinted in 68 Fed. Reg. 42,152 (July 16, 2003);
SR-NASD-2002-77: Disclosure of Audit Opinions With Going Concern Qualifications
(proposed June 11, 2002), reprinted in 68 Fed. Reg. 41,191 (July 10, 2003) [hereinafter
collectively NASDAQ Proposed Amendments].
This Article was based on the SEC and Exchange rule proposals that existed as of
February 24, 2003. All citations to the final rule proposals after this date are included
only for the reader's convenience.
4 In fairness, Congress did take action to more closely regulate
and ensure the
independence of public accountants. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley § 201 (identifying nine
non-audit services that impair an accounting firm's independence); id. §§ 201-202
(requiring audit committee pre-approval of allowable services provided by auditor and
requiring disclosure of non-audit services approved by the audit committee); id. § 203
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example, a public corporation that desires to grant its executives restricted stock or stock options tied to genuine measures of performance must reflect a current balance sheet charge, but one that simply
chooses to give its executives "at-the-money" options need not.5
Likewise, the political branches of the federal government have
hesitated to give the SEC all the resources it has sought to enforce the
many existing laws that were arguably violated in the various scandals
now under investigation. 6 Even some at the SEC have expressed reluctance to have the agency play a more full-bodied role in the regulation of the accounting industry.
With debate continuing about issues like these, Congress and the
Exchanges chose instead to proceed more aggressively on other
fronts. In particular, they adopted a wide array of corporate governance requirements that embody into law, in Congress's case, and into
contract, in the case of the Exchanges, recommendations for good
corporate governance that have been advocated for many years by
commentators like Martin Lipton, Ira Millstein, former Delaware
(mandating rotation of audit partners and "time-out" periods following the rotation);
id. § 206 (requiring a one year "cooling off' period before an audit engagement team
member may accept a position with the issuer); id. § 802 (ordering retention of records relevant to audits and reviews). Congress also required greater disclosure of
certain transactions (e.g., off-balance sheet transactions), while leaving any amendments to the substantive accounting principles governing these transactions for later.
See id. § 204 (requiring auditors to timely report specific information to the audit
committee); id. § 401 (mandating explanations of certain off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations, and certain relationships); see also Conditions for Use
of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 33-8176, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-47,226, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820 (Jan. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228, 229, 244, 249) (ordering enhanced disclosure when an issuer uses non-GAAP
financial measures).
5 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., ManagerialPower and Rent Extraction in the
Design
of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 809-12 (2002) (discussing the financial accounting implications of granting different types of stock options). An "at-themoney" option is a stock option "issued at an exercise price pegged to the market
value on the issue date." Seagate Tech., Inc. v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 912, 913 n.3
(2000). Admittedly, Congress did require enhanced disclosure of such options, but
did not require boards to expense them any differently.
6 SeeJoseph A. Grundfest, Editorial, Give the SEC Its Due:
More Money, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 29, 2002, at A22 ("The SEC lacks the resources it needs to prosecute all instances
of major fraud.").
, See Michael Schroeder & Cassell Bryan-Low, Enron Collapse Has Congress Backing
Off Deregulation: Better FinancialReporting Tighter Accounting Rules Top BipartisanCall for
Changes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2002, at A22 ("[Harvey] Pitt, who represented big accounting firms as a private attorney before his SEC appointment by President Bush,
says he is developing an industry-funded response to the accounting problems, rather
than beefing up the SEC staff and budget to directly regulate the accounting industry.").

956

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 152: 953

Chancellor William Allen, and Delaware Chief Justice E. Norman
Veasey. s These distinguished commentators have long stressed the
obligations of corporate directors to be vigilant in their oversight responsibilities and the integrity-assuring benefits of genuinely independent directors whose ability to choose and oversee top management impartially could not be questioned. In aid of their shared
vision, these commentators articulated useful techniques (e.g., a majority of independent directors, the identification of a "lead" independent director, director oversight of legal compliance systems, and
regular meetings of the independent directors outside of the presence
of the management directors) that would facilitate effective monitoring by independent directors and that would limit room for abuse by
insiders.
The 2002 Reforms embrace their vision in a substantial manner.
Taken together, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the proposed Stock Exchange Rules change an aspirational agenda for best corporate practices into a largely invariable model that must be followed by any listed
company domiciled in the United States. 9
8 See generally, e.g., William T. Allen,
Independent Directorsin MBO Transactions: Are
They Fact or Fantasy, 45 BuS. LAW. 2055 (1990) (analyzing the role of independent
directors and their ability to exercise independent judgment in management buyout
transactions); Martin A. Lipton &Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest ProposalforImproved Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAw. 59 (1992) (proposing measures aimed at increasing the
board of directors' oversight of management); Martin Lipton & Theodore N. Mirvis,
ChancellorAllen and the Director, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 927, 935-38 (1997) (recounting a
speech of Chancellor William T. Allen, in which he advocated that boards ensure the
implementation of legal compliance programs); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy,
The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1283 (1998) (finding that corporations experienced improved economic performance in the presence of an active and independent board); E. Norman
Veasey, An Economic Rationale forJudicialDecisionmaking in CorporateLaw, 53 BUS. LAW.
681, 687-88 (1998) (discussing the importance of independent directors); E. Norman
Veasey, Should CorporationLaw Inform Aspirationsfor Good Corporate Governance Practicesor Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2179 (2001) (encouraging voluntary adoption of best
practices by corporate boards).
9The
Stock Exchanges generally permit a foreign company to follow its own
domestic rules so long as the company discloses the differences. See NYSE PROPOSED
RULES, supra note 3, § 303a(11) ("Listed foreign private issuers must disclose any significant ways in which their corporate governance practices differ from those followed
by domestic companies under NYSE listing standards."); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at
22-23 (recommending that foreign private issuers be required to reveal differences in
corporate governance practices); NASD Manual R. 4320(e) (2) (C) (2003) ("An issuer's
qualifications will be determined on the basis of financial statements prepared in
accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles or those accompanied
by detailed schedules quantifying the differences between U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles and those of the issuer's country of domicile."), available at
http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/nasd-manual.pdf; see also Disclosure of Exemptions
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As members of a Delaware judiciary that has voiced strong support
for many of the "best practices" that are now embodied in the 2002
Reforms, it would smack of hypocrisy for us to fail to acknowledge the
substantial integrity-generating potential of these initiatives. In many
respects, the 2002 Reforms reflect a recognition that useful practices
that have been encouraged by the more tentative and contextuallyspecific teachings of the common law of corporations are sufficiently
workable and valuable to merit system-wide implementation.
Still, Delaware judges also anticipate being among the first governmental decision makers to confront real-world disputes influenced
by the 2002 Reforms. These Reforms purport to mandate a wide
range of actions by directors of Delaware corporations. Thus, it is
unavoidable that the Delaware judges charged with adjudicating directorial compliance with legal and equitable duties will confront
cases in which the mandates of the 2002 Reforms make their legal
debut. Appropriate candor, therefore, requires us to acknowledge
our concerns regarding some aspects of the 2002 Reforms.
First, many appear to have been taken off the shelf and put into
the mix, not so much because they would have helped to prevent the
recent scandals, but because they filled the perceived need for farreaching reform and were less controversial than other measures
more clearly aimed at preventing similar scandals. This is not to say
that the asserted motivations behind the 2002 Reforms were not sincere. Rather, it recognizes the reality that this year's scandals gave
advocates who had long desired certain aspects of the Reforms an
opening to actually obtain serious consideration and adoption of their
proposals, regardless of the lack of a clear connection between those
proposals and the conduct that caused the scandals. And, unsurprisingly, the 2002 Reforms also have a somewhat random quality, which
reveals the desire of many in the political and corporate governance
worlds to leave some imprint on the resulting product.
All of this is to say that the 2002 Reforms are typical of major remedial measures that result from our political process. Though the
Reforms contain much that is likely to be of enduring value, they also
suffer from the rapidity of their enactment and a tendency to deal
with many issues somewhat superficially and sporadically, rather than
with one or two issues deeply and coherently. Overall, however, the
by Non-U.S. Issuers from Nasdaq's Corporate Governance Listing Standards, 68 Fed.
Reg. 41,193 (proposedJuly 10, 2003) (requiring foreign issuers to disclose any exemptions they may receive from NASDAQ's corporate governance listing standards and to
describe alternative practices used in lieu of these requirements).
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2002 Reforms promise benefits to the nation's investors, so long as
they are implemented with sensitivity by policymakers who are openminded about the need to tailor the Reforms when necessary to ensure workability.
As a modest contribution to the early stages of that process, this
Article seeks to anticipate some of the more interesting potential implications of the 2002 Reforms for substantive state corporation law.
Although it is difficult to predict the full ramifications of the 2002
Reforms for state law, what is clear is that the Reforms represent a
marked increase in federal government and Exchange regulation of
the corporate boardroom. As will be shown, the 2002 Reforms prescribe a host of specific procedures and mechanisms that corporate
boards must employ in the governance of their firms. These prescriptions impinge on the managerial freedom permitted to directors by
state corporation law and will fuel a new round of dialogue among the
three sources of corporate governance policy that predominate in the
American system: the federal government (principally through the
SEC), state governments (through their corporate codes and the
common law of corporations), and the Stock Exchanges (through
their rules and listing requirements).'°
The dialogue among these policymakers is, of course, not novel.
For most of the last century, these policymakers have influenced each
other and have intruded on each other's principal domains in the
10

One can actually conceive of the Stock Exchange Rules as part and parcel of the

federal regulatory scheme. The Exchange Rules are in fact required by federal law.
To wit, section 6 of the Exchange Act limits registration to Exchanges that have rules
addressing certain statutory issues. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2000) ("An exchange shall
not be registered as a national securities exchange unless .. . [it can] enforce compliance by its members and persons associated with its members, with the provisions of
this title, the rules and regulations thereunder, and the rules of the exchange.").
Section 15A(b) (6) of the Exchange Act describes the purpose of Exchange Rules:
[T]o prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just
and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with
persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with
respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove impediments
to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest ....
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2000); see also id. § 78f(a) (presenting the same criteria to
protect investors and the public interest). Because the statutory authorization for the
Exchange Rules has not, however, been interpreted to give the SEC regulatory authority over corporate internal affairs, see Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), and because the Exchanges retain considerable, if not unlimited, freedom
to shape their own rules, we treat them for discussion purposes as independently important elements of a tri-cornered system of corporate governance for public companies.
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overall American system of corporate governance. That said, the 2002
Reforms appear to be a relatively aggressive move by the federal government and the Exchanges into the realm of board decision making
and composition, an area where, traditionally, the states have been
predominant." As we will show, the Reforms generate creative friction with some state law concepts, which may result in adaptations in
state law or in amendments to the Reforms themselves.
In this Article, we do not seek to predict the outcome of this upcoming dialogue. Rather, we limit ourselves largely to identifying
areas that are likely to generate policy intersection in the litigation
process and to advancing some tentative perspectives on the resulting
possibilities (pro and con) for the American corporate governance
system. Our goal is not to be exhaustive, but to concentrate on a few
subjects where some level of policy conflict or evolution might reasonably be expected. 12 We use the law of our own state, Delaware, as
being generally representative of state corporate laws to help make
our discussion more concrete.
In order to rationally pursue this objective, we begin Part I with a
brief overview of those aspects of the 2002 Reforms that address areas
of corporate responsibility that are traditionally the primary focus of

11The incursions into untraditional territory within the
past year have not all

come from the federal government and the Exchanges. The creativity of New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in using a unique New York statute enabled him to play
a major role in areas of securities industry enforcement and policy that were traditionally dominated by the SEC, a role that in turn put pressure on the SEC to undertake
new regulatory measures it otherwise might not have. See Charles Gasparino & Michael Schroeder, Pitt and Spitzer Butted Heads to Overhaul Wall Street Research, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 31, 2002, at Al ("Mr. Spitzer so effectively launched his crusade to punish Wall
Street that he forced Mr. Pitt to take action.").
12 We intentionally choose not to discuss the
implications the new federal mandate for the "fair presentation" of the financial condition of public companies will have
on the state law duty of disclosure required of corporate directors as fiduciaries. See
Sarbanes-Oxley § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2003). See generally Certification
of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Securities Act Release No.
33-8124, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,427, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002)
(enacting rules implementing section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley). This is not because it is
not an important subject; it is. Given the deference states have paid to federal disclosure standards in shaping the state fiduciary duty of disclosure, see, e.g., Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting the federal materiality standard), the apparently heightened duty of disclosure required by Sarbanes-Oxley may
give rise to interesting state law cases, particularly in the context of injunction applications connected to stockholder votes. Disclosure regulation is traditionally a core
federal concern, however, and our focus is on those aspects of the 2002 Reforms that
appear to reflect a more expansive policy domain for the federal government and the
Exchanges.
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state law. We move from there to address specific policy consequences that we perceive as resulting from these Reforms.
Specifically, in Part I, we note the overall discord between the prescriptive quality of the 2002 Reforms-particularly the proposed Exchange Rules-and the enabling approach to corporate regulation
taken by the Delaware General Corporation Law. Under the Delaware
approach, boards are given wide authority to pursue lawful goals unhampered by numerous procedural mandates, but with the constraints of fiduciary duty and targeted statutory requirements (such as
mandates for stockholder votes on key transactions) as the primary
safeguards. By contrast, the 2002 Reforms require that corporate
boards establish an array of specific committees comprised of directors with certain characteristics, which must carry out specific tasks.
Although many of these mandates have been recommended by Delaware courts as best practice, there is inarguable tension between the
Delaware approach of avoiding prescriptive procedural requirements
and that of the 2002 Reforms.
In Part II, we articulate worries that arise out of this tension: have
the 2002 Reforms left boards with sufficient time to grapple with key
business issues, like the company's strategic direction and oversight of
managerial performance? Will the 2002 Reforms be workable for
small- and mid-cap public companies without large legal and auditing
staffs?
In Part III, we note the reality that the 2002 Reforms will likely
generate new shareholder litigation in the state courts. This litigation
will put pressure on states to harmonize their laws with the Reforms
and expose some features of the Reforms that may need alteration.
In Part IV, we turn to the implications of the 2002 Reforms' treatment of the independent director concept. We first note that there is
a great deal of harmony between the sentiments behind the 2002
Reforms and Delaware case law, to the extent that the Reforms recognize the independence-compromising effects of consulting contracts,13

13 Although both Sarbanes-Oxley and Delaware law are suspicious
of the independence of directors who receive consulting fees from their companies, the former
favors a bright-line approach to the problem, while the latter focuses on the context in
which the consulting fees were paid and their materiality. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley §
301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (m) (3) (B) (i) (West Supp. 2003) (prohibiting audit committee
members from receiving certain consulting, advisory, and compensatory fees from the
company) to the following Delaware cases taking a more contextual approach: In re
The Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 17148, 2002 WL 537692, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar.
27, 2002); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 29-30 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re Ply Gem Indus.,
Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 15779, 2001 WL 755133, at *9 (Del. Ch.June 26, 2001); In re
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familial ties, 4 and other factors that create structural bias.1 Because
of this, the 2002 Reforms may have the virtue of simplifying some aspects of corporate litigation (e.g., derivative actions), and that simplifying effect could be beneficial.
But the implications of the 2002 Reforms' definitional exercise
are not uniformly positive. Notably, the 2002 Reforms take a less
optimistic view of the independence of directors who own, or are
affiliated with owners of, substantial but non-controlling blocks of
stock. In Part IV.A, we question the wisdom of this skepticism-which
is contrary to Delaware case law and the recommendations of respected corporate governance advocates-because it seems to discourage director service by a class of persons who would seem to have
the right incentives to act as faithful monitors of corporate integrity

Freeport-McMoran Sulphur, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16729, 2001 WL 50203, at *4-5
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2001); Merchs. Nat'l Props., Inc. v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 2000 WL
1041229, at *6 (Del. Ch.July 24, 2000); White v.Panic, 793 A.2d 356, 366-67 (Del. Ch.
2000); Friedman v. Beningson, No. 12232, 1995 WL 716762, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4,
1995); In re MAXXAM, Inc., 659 A.2d 760, 774 (Del. Ch. 1995).
14 See Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d
879, 889 (Del. Ch. 1999) ("Close
familial relationships between directors can create a reasonable doubt as to impartiality."); NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R. 4200(a)(15)(C) (defining
"independent directors" so as to exclude those with certain familial relationships to
other corporate employees); NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2) (a) cmt.
("Material relationships can include ... familial relationships.").
15 For instance, the NYSE has recognized the potential for charitable
relationships
to have independence-compromising effects. See NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3,
§ 303A(2) (a) cmt. ("Material relationships can include commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial relationships (among others)." (emphasis added)); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, 19 (describing the issue of
director independence raised when a company makes substantial charitable contributions to organizations affiliated with a director). Likewise, Delaware law recognizes
that charitable relationships between a director and another constituent of the corporation (or the corporation itself) should be considered as factors in determining
whether the director's independence has been compromised. The Delaware Court of
Chancery has reasoned that if a director's favorite charity receives donations from the
corporation (or from certain corporate officers), then the director might feel beholden to certain officers within the corporation. The supposedly independent director, then, might compromise his independence with the hope that pleasing (or at least
not displeasing) these officers will lead to future donations to the charity. The approach of the court has not, however, been a bright-line one. Rather, the court evaluates the effect of donations to a charity affiliated with a supposedly independent director on a fact-intensive, case-by-case basis. For examples of cases where charitable
relationships influenced the determination of whether a director was independent, see
In re The Limited, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,2002 WL 537692, at *7; In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litigation, 731 A.2d 342, 359 (Del. Ch. 1998), affd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 966-67
(Del. Ch. 1985).
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and performance at a time when these same Reforms will create an
increased demand for quality independent directors.
On a different tack, in Part IV.B, we note the care with which the
independent director concept must be used. As a general matter, the
2002 Reforms apply a blanket label to directors, identifying a broader
class of directors as "non-independent" without as much regard for
context as state corporation law has had. Common law courts must be
careful to remember that the label placed on a director is not determinative of whether the director has breached his fiduciary duties. In
particular, judges must be mindful of the distinction between those
directors who have a conflicting "interest" in a transaction and those
directors whose ability to act impartially-i.e., independently-on a
transaction might be questioned because of their relationship to another person who has an interest. Before monetary damages are imposed on a non-independent director, however, due process requires
an inquiry into whether the director in fact acted with the requisite
culpability to sustain a damages award. Absent the assurance of judicial conformity with this principle, the 2002 Reforms may deter wellqualified people from serving on boards.
Next, in Part V, we point out that the 2002 Reforms deepen the
American corporate governance system's reliance upon independent
directors who (in this ideal conception) feel accountable only to the
corporation and its stockholders. At the same time, however, the 2002
Reforms leave in place an incumbent-dominated electoral system that
provides little opportunity for competitive elections in the absence of
a hostile takeover bid. The absence of action on this front arguably
leaves our system of corporate democracy incomplete, and is a subject
that is worthy of attention by state lawmakers, in whose domain the
responsibility for reform of this kind primarily resides.
In Part VI, we note that one likely consequence of the 2002
Reforms will be a continuing reduction in management directors.
This reduction will not, we venture, coincide with any diminution in
the importance of top managers in the actual management of public
companies. In order to ensure that the deterrent and remedial value
of fiduciary duty suits are not, for practical reasons, decreased in the
process, we identify useful changes to Delaware statutory law that will
enable our courts to exert personal jurisdiction over key executives
who are charged with breaches of fiduciary duty, but who are not directors of the company.
Finally, in Part VII, we conclude on an optimistic note. Although
the 2002 Reforms will have a somewhat destabilizing effect on the
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traditional division of responsibilities among the federal government,
the Stock Exchanges, and the states, there is no need for despair at
the state level. So long as the states participate fully and actively in the
process of implementing the 2002 Reforms and, as importantly, improving state corporate law to promote integrity and stockholder welfare, the basic tripartite division of policy responsibility that has served
our nation well should remain largely intact.

I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE 2002 REFORMS
Because this Article concentrates on the likely consequences the
2002 Reforms will have on the intersection of state corporation law
with federal law and the Exchange Rules, the overview we present is
intentionally selective. It omits many important aspects of the Reforms (e.g., those dealing with the process for preparing financial
statements of public companies) because they address areas that have
traditionally been a concern of the federal government and, to a
lesser extent, the Exchanges. We emphasize only those features of
the 2002 Reforms that best illustrate the extent to which the Reforms
address subjects that are traditionally the primary province of substantive corporation law, as articulated by the legislatures and courts of the
states.
A. The 2002 Reforms Will Create a Need for
Additional Independent Director Candidates
A good way to understand the effect that the 2002 Reforms will
have on corporate boardrooms is to imagine a Delaware corporation
listed on the New York Stock Exchange in the year 2004.16 By that
time, as a result of the combined force of Sarbanes-Oxley and the new
NYSE Rules, our hypothetical Delaware company would be required
to have:

16 The NYSE has articulated less-exacting independence requirements for subsidi-

aries controlled by a cohesive voting block of more than 50%, which generally only
subject such subsidiaries to the audit committee provisions of its board reforms. See
NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(1) cmt. ("A company of which more than
50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another company need
not have a majority of independent directors on its board or have nominating/corporate governance and compensation committees comprised of independent
directors."); see also NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R. 4350(c) (5)
(exempting controlled companies, which are defined as "compan [ies] of which more
than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another company,"
from director independence requirements).
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17
A majority of independent directors on its board;
An audit committee comprised entirely of independent
directors that performs certain mandated tasks. The audit
committee also must have a financial expert as defined in
Sarbanes-Oxley, or the company 18must disclose why it does
not have such a financial expert;
A nominating/corporate governance committee comprised entirely of independent directors; 9

NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(1); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at

6; see also NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R. 4350(c) (1) (stating that a
"majority of the board of directors must be comprised of independent directors").
18 Sarbanes-Oxley required the SEC to adopt rules byJanuary 26, 2003, that would
require companies to disclose whether at least one member of the audit committee is a
financial expert, and to explain why if not. Sarbanes-Oxley § 407, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265
(West Supp. 2003). The final version of this rule was recently adopted and narrowed
the term "financial expert" to "audit committee financial expert." Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Rules on Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley
The rule also
Act (Jan. 15, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-6.htm.
broadened somewhat the definition of an audit committee financial expert to address
concerns about the ability of companies to find qualified experts. See id. (explaining
the attributes that a person must possess to qualify as an "audit committee financial
expert," and suggesting various alternative means by which a person might acquire the
requisite attributes); see also NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(6) (requiring
that "director's fees are the only compensation an audit committee member may receive from the company"); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 11-17 (discussing the requirements for audit committee membership, the requirements for audit committee
chairperson, and the increased authority and responsibilities of the audit committee).
The NYSE also requires each member of the audit committee to be "financially
literate" or to become "financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his
or her appointment to the audit committee ...." N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED
COMPA\NY MANUAL § 303.01 (B) (2) (b) (2002) [hereinafter LISTED COMPANY MANUAL];
see also id. § 303.01 (B) (2) (c) ("At least one member of the audit committee must have
accounting or related financial management expertise, as the Board of Directors interprets such qualification in its business judgment."); NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra
note 3, § 303A(6) cmt. (maintaining the NYSE's requirement that each member of a
company's audit committee be "financially literate" and that at least one member of a
company's audit committee "have accounting or related financial management expertise"). "Financially literate," which is a term of imprecise meaning, is, according to the
NYSE, "interpreted by the company's Board of Directors in its business judgment."
LISTED COMPANY MWNUAL, supra, § 303.01 (B) (2) (b). The NASDAQ Proposed Amendments require that each member of a company's audit committee be able "to read and
understand fundamental financial statements, including a company's balance sheet,
income statement, and cash flow statement" and that "each issuer... certify that it has,
and will continue to have, at least one member of the audit committee who is a financial expert." NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R. 4350(d) (2) (A) (ii).
19NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(4); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at
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*

A compensation committee comprised entirely of independent directors;2" and
* Regularly scheduled meetings of the non-management directors outside the presence of the management directors.
If a single presiding director is selected, his or her identity
must be publicly disclosed. Alternatively, a rotating presiding director may be used if the company designates and
discloses the selection procedure for the rotating director.2
A Delaware company listed on the NASDAQ would confront similar
S22
requirements.
Accompanying these mandates is a panoply of specific action
items that are required of these independent directors. For example,
listed companies are required under the proposed NYSE rules to issue
corporate governance guidelines addressing:
* Director qualification standards;
"

Director responsibilities;

20 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3,

10.

§ 303A(5); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at

NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(3); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at
8. The proposed NYSE rules specifically recognize that some non-management direcSee NYSE
tors will not fall within the Exchange's definition of independence.
PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(3) (using the term "non-management" directors rather than "independent").
22 For the sake of brevity, we concentrate our narrative
mostly on the proposed
NYSE Rules, but do note, when pertinent, differences in the approaches of the two key
Exchanges. The NASDAQ differs somewhat from the NYSE. NASDAQ does not require separate nominating and compensation committees, but does require that
nomination and compensation decisions be approved by a majority of the independent directors on the board. NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R.
4350(c) (3). NASDAQ allows non-independent directors to serve on the various committees, including the audit committee, in exceptional and limited circumstances
when doing so is in the best interests of the company and when disclosure of those
circumstances is made. Id. R. 4350(d) (2) (B). A non-independent director cannot
serve more than two years on an audit committee and cannot be the chair of the
committee. Id. But a new proposed rule may extinguish this flexibility for nonindependent directors on audit committees by requiring Exchanges to delist issuers
that do not comply with audit committee requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No.
33-8137, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,137, 68 Fed. Reg. 2638, 2660-63 (proposed
Jan. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Proposed Audit Committee Standards]. NASDAQ also
requires the independent directors to meet separately from the non-independent
directors at least twice per year. NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R.
4350(c)(2). Thus, the Exchanges differ in how they separate the directors. NYSE
separates directors on the basis of management status; NASDAQ separates based on
independence.
21
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" Director access to management and outside advisors;
* Director compensation;
* Director orientation and continuing education;
* Management succession; and
* Annual self-evaluation of the board. 3
Supplementing this requirement is a mandate for each corporation to adopt a code of business conduct and ethics for directors and
officers, addressing, among other things, conflicts of interest, corporate opportunities, confidentiality, and legal compliance. 24 Any waivers granted under the code must be made by the board, or a board
committee, and be disclosed to stockholders.2 5 This NYSE requirement comes on top of the requirement in Sarbanes-Oxley for listed
companies to develop a code of ethics for senior financial officers,
including the CFO, or disclose why they have not done so.26 Like the
NYSE requirement, any waivers granted under the statutorily mandated code must be disclosed. 7
Taken in their entirety, the 2002 Reforms will certainly increase
the demand for quality independent directors. Some of the remaining companies that lack a majority of independent directors will
have to find new board members. 28 Other companies with an existing
NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(9) cmt.; NYSE REPORT, supra
note
3, at 18-20.
24 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(1O) & cmt.; NYSE REPORT, supra
23

note 3, at 20-22. The NASDAQ Proposed Amendments require a similar "code of
conduct for all directors, officers and employees." NASDAQ Proposed Amendments,
supra note 3, R. 4350(m). This code will have to address compliance and conflicts
issues and must provide for an enforcement mechanism. SR-NASD-2002-139: Adoption of a Code of Conduct for all Directors, Officers, and Employees, supra note 3, at 910.
25 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(10)
& cmt.; NYSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 20.
26 Sarbanes-Oxley § 406, 15 U.S.C.A. §
7264 (West Supp. 2003).
27 Id. § 406(b); Disclosure Required by Sections 404,
406 and 407 of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 33-8138, Exchange Act Release No. 3446,701, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208 (proposed Oct. 30, 2002).
28 According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, as of 2001,
approximately 75% of NYSE-listed companies had independent board majorities. SeeJoann S.
Lublin, NYSE Considers Rules to Boost Power of Boards: Fostering the Independence Of Directors Could Improve Governance, Advisers Say, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2002, at A2 (discussing
the Center's analysis of 1100 companies' proxy statements); see also Lucian Arye
Bebchuk et al., The Powerful AntitakeoverForce of Staggered Boards: FurtherFindings and a
Reply to Symposium Participants,55 STAN. L. REV. 885, 896 n.33 (2002) (finding 65% of
directors independent under preexisting concepts of independence) (citing INVESTOR
RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., BOARD PRACTICES/BOARD PAY 2001: THE STRUCTURE
AND COMPENSATION OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AT S&P SUPER 1500 COMPANIES
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independent majority will have to add more directorial slots in order
to have the horsepower to carry out all the tasks required of independent directors under the 2002 Reforms. This increased demand
for independent directors will also confront a supply diminished by
the tighter standards of independence embraced by the Reforms,
which may well render directors currently categorized as independent
unable to serve on key board committees.
B. The 2002 Reforms'Definition of an
IndependentDirector
Unsurprisingly, the 2002 Reforms' approach to defining director
independence has largely been a negative exercise, which rules out
those persons whose attributes seem to undermine their ability to
impartially monitor management, ensure overall corporate integrity,
and selflessly pursue the interests of the company and its stockholders.
For the most part, this aspect of the 2002 Reforms is embodied in the
proposed Exchange Rules rather than in Sarbanes-Oxley.
The definitional direction of the 2002 Reforms accords with best
practice recommendations of sophisticated commentators and the
policy advocacy of institutional investor activists like the Council of
Institutional Investors. 29 The Exchanges attempt to cleanse the independent director ranks of corporate America of persons whose familial, personal, professional, or financial affiliations with management
cast doubt on their ability to pursue only the interests of the
company's stockholders. By this means, the Exchanges seek to end

(2002)); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 897 n.29 (2002) (stating that a "minority of public companies .,. lack a majority of independent directors"); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 921 (1999) ("In the 1960s, most [large American
companies] had a majority of inside directors; today, almost all have a majority of
outside directors and most have a majority of 'independent' directors."); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies With a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN.
ECON. 185, 185 tbl.1 (1996) (reporting on the composition of the boards of directors
at the top 500 companies, which on average were made up of 54% outside directors
and 10% "gray" directors-i.e., those that are neither wholly inside directors nor wholly
outside directors).
See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Council of Institutional Investors at 13,
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (No. 469-1998) (on file with authors) (discussing the Council's definition of an "'independent director' as someone whose 'only
non-trivial professional, familial or financial connection to the corporation or its CEO
is his or her directorship."').
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the structural bias in favor of management that has (in the minds of
many stockholder activists) characterized the American boardroom.
To this end, the NYSE has defined an independent director as a
person who:
* Has (by vote of his or her fellow directors) been determined to have no material
relationship to the company
3°
director;
a
as
than
other
* Has not served as an employee or auditor of the company
3'
for five
years, or been a family member of someone who
3
has;
* Has not served for five years as an employee or auditor of
any other company whose compensation committee includes an executive officer of the company, or been a family member of someone who has; 33 and
* Is not a family member of an executive officer of the com34
pany.

.
at6.

NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2) (a); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3,

NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2) (b) (i); NYSE REPORT,
supra
note 3, at 6. Under Delaware law, the mere fact that a corporate director is also a
former officer of the corporation does not automatically make the director not independent. The nature of the director's former service and the temporal distance between his former employment and his current directorial service are, however, factors
a court will consider in determining whether the director's independence is compromised. Cf Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 184 n.1 (Del. 1988) (defining outside directors to mean non-employee, non-management directors); Citron v. Steego Corp., No.
10171, 1988 WL 94738, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 1988) ("A majority of the Steego board
members appear to be independent directors in the sense that they are not current
officers of the Company, nor do they appear to derive substantial income from regular
transaction of business with the firm." (emphasis added)). The 2002 Reforms' criticism of the distinction between current and former officers is not novel. See Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1619 (1978) (stating that a "director who formerly was an officer or employee of the corporation, but who no longer has staff or
operating responsibilities by reason of retirement or otherwise," should be regarded as
a "management director since he may often be called upon to review or otherwise act
in connection with matters in which he was involved while in active management").
32 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2)
(b) (iv); NYSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 7.
33 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2)(b)(iii);
NYSE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 7.
34 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2)
(b); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3,
at 6. Family members "includes a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, mothers[-] and fathers-in-law, sons[-] and daughters-in-law, brothers[-] and sisters-in-law,
and anyone (other than employees) who shares such person's home."
NYSE
PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2) (b) (iv) cmt.
31
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The NASDAQ definition is similar, but differs in these important
respects:
* NASDAQ considers any taint from former managerial or
officer service to be removed after three years instead of
the five required by the NYSE;3
* NASDAQ has a broader definition of family member that
includes any person who is a relative by blood,
marriage,
36
or adoption, or who has the same residence;
*

NASDAQ finds a taint when a person has received more
than $60,000 from the company for consulting or other
non-director services over the past three years,37 or when
the director was a partner, officer, or controlling shareholder of a company that made or received payments to
the company in excess of certain amounts within the past
three years.

381

Even stricter rules apply to audit committee service. For purposes
of service on the audit committee, a director is deemed independent
by Sarbanes-Oxley only if he receives no compensation from the company other than as a director and is not an "affiliated person" of the
company or one of its subsidiaries.33 Under preexisting federal law,
the only precise definition of an "affiliated person" referenced in the
Exchange Act suggested that a director who controls, or is affiliated
with (e.g., serves as an officer or director of) any stockholder who
controls five percent or more of the company's shares would be ineligible to serve as a voting member of the audit committee.4 0 The SEC,
NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R. 4200(a) (15).
Id. R. 4200(a)(14).
37 Id. R. 4200(a)
(15) (B).
38 Id. R. 4200(a)
(15) (D).
39 Sarbanes-Oxley § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1
(in) (3) (B) (West Supp. 2003). Section
301 states in part:
In order to be considered to be independent for purposes of this paragraph, a
member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her
capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any
other board committee(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or
(ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.
4o The Exchange Act expressly and broadly incorporates the Investment Company
Act of 1940's definition of "affiliated person." See Exchange Act § 3(a)(19), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(19) (2000) ("The terms 'investment company,' 'affiliated person,' 'insurance
company,' 'separate account,' and 'company' have the same meanings as in the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. [§§] 80a-1 et seq.]."). The Investment
Company Act's definition has a triggering threshold of five percent, and any person
35
36
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in proposed Rule 10A-3, recently proposed a definition of the term
"affiliated person" in Sarbanes-Oxley that it contends is consistent
with its definition of the term "affiliate" in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange
Act 4 l and Rule 144 of the Securities Act.42 The SEC's proposed definition, however, is more lax than, and therefore conflicts with, 43 the
preexisting Exchange Act definition of "affiliated person" in that it
establishes a safe harbor that excludes persons who own or are affiliated with entities owning less than ten percent and are not executive
officers or directors of the company.44
In intellectual harmony with Sarbanes-Oxley, the original NYSE
Report recommended that directors affiliated with a stockholder
holding more than twenty percent of the company's
shares could not
S
45
serve as a voting member on the audit committee. The NYSE's more
restrictive proposal was apparently dropped in view of the outright
ban on audit committee participation by such owner-directors contained within Sarbanes-Oxley, but the original recommendation is
unlikely to be easily forgotten by shareholder activists or plaintiffs'
lawyers. Indeed, if a director is to serve on the audit committee, the

owning or controlling more than this quantity of the issuer's securities would conclusively fit the definition of an affiliated person of the issuer:
"Affiliated person" of another person means (A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or
more of the outstanding voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly
or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner,
copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such other person is an
investment company, any investment adviser thereof or any member of any
advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (3) (2000).
41 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2003) ("An 'affiliate' of, or a person
'affiliated' with, a
specified person, is a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person
specified.").
42 Id. § 230.144(a)(1) ("An affiliate of an issuer is a person
that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with, such issuer.").
43 This new definition not only raises the percentage of ownership from
five percent to ten percent, it also changes the quality of the characterization from a conclusive description to a rebuttable presumption. That is, the SEC's proposal creates two
different definitions of "affiliated person" under the Exchange Act-one for SarbanesOxley purposes and one that will govern under the remainder of the Exchange Act.
44 Proposed Audit Committee Standards,
supra note 22, at 2641.
45

NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at
11.
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NASDAQ still requires him to meet the Act's requirements; be independent as described above; and not own or control twenty percent or
more of the issuer's voting securities, or such lower measurement 46as
may be established by the SEC under section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
C. The Clearest Example of the New Federalism: The New Substantive and
ProceduralChecks on Directorand Officer Compensation

In one subject area, the 2002 Reforms are easy to see as intrusions
on the domain of the states. 47 In section 402 of Sarbanes-Oxley,
Congress explicitly bans corporations from making loans to directors

46 NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R.
4350(d) (2) (A) (i).

Although director and officer compensation is one clear example of federal
intrusion into a traditional state domain, it is by no means the only one. For example,
establishing and enforcing standards for attorney professional conduct is another area
traditionally left to the states. See, e.g., In re Benson, 774 A.2d 258 (Del. 2001) (holding
that the Delaware Supreme Court "has the inherent and exclusive authority for disciplining members of the Delaware bar" for violating the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of
Professional Conduct). But section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley directs the SEC to "issue
rules, in the public interest and for the protection of investors, setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys." Sarbanes-Oxley § 307, 15 U.S.C.A. §
7245 (West Supp. 2003). Accordingly, the SEC recently adopted rules governing attorneys' professional responsibilities. Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, Exchange Act Release No.
34-47,276, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003). These proposed "minimum standards"
include controversial reporting requirements imposed upon attorneys who come
across evidence of an issuer's violation of securities laws or fiduciary duties. In these
circumstances, the attorney must report the evidence to the chief legal counsel or
chief executive officer (or the equivalent, including an optional qualified legal compliance committee) of the issuer, and then to the audit committee, another committee of
independent directors, or even the full board of directors, if the recipient of the initial
report does not appropriately respond to it. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (3) (2003); see also
Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct
Rule Under Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Jan.23, 2003) (announcing the adoption of final
rules to implement section 307 and describing the effect of the adopted rules),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htn.
In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley requires each audit committee to establish procedures
to receive complaints and anonymous tips from whistieblowers. Because the regulation of attorney conduct is traditionally a matter of state regulation, it is not surprising
that the SEC's proposals have already evoked concern on the part of the Conference of
Chief Justices. See Letter from the Conference of Chief Justices, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 13, 2002) (on file with authors)
(expressing concern that Sarbanes-Oxley's regulation of attorney conduct raises federalism concerns and the possibility "that lawyers may be subject to inconsistent regulations at the state and federal levels"). For our purposes, it is noteworthy that the proposed rules would permit the SEC to sanction attorneys for failing to report breaches
of fiduciary duty-thus requiring the SEC to make judgments about whether material
evidence of a state corporate law breach existed.
47
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and officers, with certain limited exceptions. 48 This is a direct federal
limitation on the power of state-chartered corporations to engage in a
particular type of transaction explicitly authorized by state statutory
law,4 a type of limitation that more traditional minds might think
should flow from the chartering states, rather than from the federal
government. The ban inspired a group of prominent law firms to
write a joint memorandum articulating their shared view of the appropriate scope of the ban. 50 In particular, the law firms addressed
whether the ban on loans would deny companies the ability to advance litigation costs to directors and officers in accordance with
Delaware law. 5
The Exchanges have also delved into the compensation area in a
manner that would typically find its manifestation in a state corporate
code. The proposed Exchange Rules require stockholder approval
52
for certain equity-based compensation plans.
In this way, the Exchanges have demonstrated a willingness to go beyond state requirements for stockholder votes when they believe that those requirements are insufficient to protect stockholder interests.
Notably, the Exchanges' more aggressive regulation of the internal affairs of their listed companies is not necessarily limited to the
subject of compensation. An interesting NASDAQ proposal requiresall

See Sarbanes-Oxley § 402, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(k) (West Supp. 2003) ("It shall
be
unlawful for any issuer... to extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of
credit, or to renew an extension of credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any
director or executive officer. .. ").
49 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (2001) (authorizing loans
to employees and
officers of a corporation whenever "in the judgment of the directors, such loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation").
50 Memorandum from Alston & Bird LLP et al., Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Interpretive
Issues Under § 402-Prohibition of Certain Insider Loans 3-8 (Oct. 15, 2002) (on file
with authors).
51 See id. at 5-6 (discussing advancement of litigation costs as possibly
implicating
Sarbanes-Oxley's prohibition on personal loans); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(e) (2001) (enabling corporations to advance litigation costs under certain conditions).
52 See NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(8) ("[S]hareholders
must be
given the opportunity to vote on all equity-based compensation plans, except inducement options, plans relating to mergers or acquisitions, and tax qualified and excess
benefit plans."); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 17-18 ("Shareholders must be given the
opportunity to vote on all equity-based compensation plans."); see also Shareholder
Approval of Equity Compensation Plans and the Voting of Proxies, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-46,620, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,486 (proposed Oct. 11, 2002) (giving notice of
and discussing parameters of the rule change); Shareholder Approval for Stock Option Plans or Other Arrangements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,649, 67 Fed. Reg.
64,173 (proposed Oct. 17, 2002) (discussing the NASDAQ proposal).
48
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related party transactions to be "approved by the company's audit
committee or a comparable body of the board of directors .... ,.

In

contrast, Delaware law allows proof of fairness or stockholder ratification to substitute for the use of a special committee in validating an
interested transaction. 4 This protection of interested transactions
that are either fair or shareholder-approved is an allowance not afforded under the NASDAQ proposal.
With these basic features of the 2002 Reforms in mind, we now
turn to some of the implications they have for state corporate law.
II. ARE THE 2002

REFORMS A SHADOW CORPORATE LAW?

The most striking feature of the 2002 Reforms is a pervasive and
general one: the extent to which they can be seen as a shadow corporation law that requires public company boards to comply with a very
specific set of procedural prescriptions.55 This aspect of the Reforms
represents a departure from the general spheres in which the three
principal sources of corporate governance guidance in the American
system have operated. Stated very roughly, the division between the
two governmental authorities has given primary responsibility for fair
disclosure and securities market regulation to the federal government,
principally through the SEC. State law has retained the substantive
regulation of corporate transactions and board conduct. The Exchanges have played a more mixed role, through listing requirements
and rules of some diversity, but generally with non-burdensome effects. These include requirements for stockholder votes on certain
transactions that do not require such approval under state law,5 6 and,
53 NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R.
4350(h).
54 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2)

(2001).

55 For recently released articles that express (in stronger terms) some of
the same

sentiments and concerns we raise here, the interested reader should consult the provocative and well-written articles by Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's
DirectorIndependence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370 (2002), and Simon Lorne,
Sarbanes-Oxley: The PerniciousBeginnings of Usurpation?, WALL ST. LAW., Sept. 2002, at 1.
56 The NYSE has long required a stockholder vote on any transaction that would
result in an increase in the listed company's outstanding shares by twenty percent or
more. See LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 18, § 312.03(c) (explaining that
shareholder approval is required "prior to the issuance of common stock, or of securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock .. "). This requirement has
often influenced the dynamics of mergers and acquisitions cases arising under Delaware corporate law. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d
1140, 1146 (Del. 1989) (noting that under the NYSE rules, but not under Delaware
corporate law, the shareholders of Time would have been required to approve the
original Time-Warner merger agreement).
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perhaps most notably, for audit committees comprised of independent directors.
This division of responsibilities has never been marked by bright
borders. To the contrary, many federal disclosure requirements have
had the natural and (presumably) intended consequence of influencing boardroom practices. Similarly, the state law of fiduciary duties
has been an important tool in evolving better disclosure practices,
particularly in the context of mergers and acquisitions requiring a
stockholder vote or tendering decision. The tug-and-pull among the
various policy actors has occurred in a civil manner, manifesting a
sincere concern for the creation of an overall system that functions
fairly and efficiently and that avoids whipsawing corporate officials
with contradictory or unworkable mandates from different sources of
legitimate authority.
In several respects, however, the 2002 Reforms can be seen as different in kind from previous incursions across the rough borders of
policy responsibility that have characterized the American system of
corporate governance to date.5s The isolated provision of SarbanesOxley that bans most loans from public corporations to their directors
and officers is the most obvious example. By this method, Congress
took upon itself responsibility for delimiting the range of permissible
transactions that corporations chartered by state law could consummate. In itself, the mandate is relatively trivial, but its precedential
significance may not be. What's next? A ban on going private transactions? Or on options-based compensation of executives? Or on
interested transactions? 59
See LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 18, § 303.01 (B) (2) ("Each
audit committee shall consist of at least three directors, all of whom have no relationship to the
company that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from management and the company....").
58 At various times during the past century or so, the federal
government and the
Exchanges have considered a more full-bodied intrusion into the states' primary role
in governing the internal relations of corporations. There is no doubt that federal
statutes exist which vest in the federal government primary or coequal governance of
corporate conduct that might seem to fall principally within the purview of state lawfor example, regulation of the corporate proxy solicitation and ballot process. For a
provocative and incisive examination of the interaction between the federal government and the states in corporate law policymaking, see MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV.L. REV. 588 (2003).
59 As noted, the NASDAQ's proposed change
to Rule 4350 requires all related
party transactions to be approved by the company's audit committee or a comparable
body of the board of directors. See NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3,
R. 4350(h) ("Each issuer shall conduct an appropriate review of all related party
transactions on an ongoing basis ...and all such transactions must be approved by the
5

2003]

THE NEW FE ,DERALISMOF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

975

The proposed Exchange Rule requiring a stockholder vote on equity compensation plans and plan amendments has a similar quality.
Under this rule, shareholders must approve "all equity-compensation
plans," other than exempt plans, and brokers may not vote on stock
option plans without client instructions.
What is the next class of
transactions that the Exchanges believe should receive stockholder
approval, irrespective of the fact that state law empowers directors to
consummate them without such approval? In recent years, for example, there has been a great deal of controversy about whether stockholders may adopt a bylaw requiring a board of directors to dismantle
a shareholder rights plan or a poison pill.61 Could the Exchanges
(with SEC approval) preempt this state law debate by adopting listing
rules requiring stockholder assent to a board's adoption of a pill in
the first place and mandating a stockholder vote on a board's decision
62
to block a bid through use of the pill in the heat of a takeover battle?

company's audit committee or comparable body of the board of directors .. ").This
diminishes the range of options available to corporations under state law, which have
typically also been able to use proof of fairness or a ratification by disinterested stockholders to validate an interested transaction. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001)
("No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or
officers... shall be void or voidable solely for this reason" if it is "approved in good
faith by vote of the shareholders[,]" is "fair as to the corporation[,]" or is "authorize[d] ...by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors ... .
60 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3,
§ 303A(8) (emphasis added).
61 These articles include John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions
Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605 (1997);Jeffrey
N. Gordon, 'JustSay Never?" Poison Pills, DeadhandPills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws:
An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997); Lawrence A. Hamermesh,
CorporateDemocracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L.
REV. 409 (1998). As Professor Robert Thompson has commented, these examples
raise two distinct, albeit related, issues. That is, the distinction between what board
decisions stockholders must approve and what decisions stockholders may make themselves (e.g., through bylaws). For our purposes, this distinction is less important than
the potential that these answers to traditionally state law questions may be dictated by
the Exchanges or the federal government.
62 Sarbanes-Oxley lacks any specific section expressing an intention
to expand the
SEC's reach into corporate internal affairs through Stock Exchange listing requirements. As a result, the SEC's authority to command state-chartered corporations to
comply with those aspects of the proposed Exchange Rules that require the formation
of certain types of committees with particular members is unclear. An important
decision predating Sarbanes-Oxley casts doubt on the ability of the SEC, through its
oversight of Exchange Rules, to regulate the internal affairs of corporations.
In Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the SEC did not have
the statutory authority to promulgate a rule barring national securities exchanges and
associations from listing stock of corporations which nullify, restrict, or disparately
reduce per share voting rights of existing common stockholders. In so ruling, the
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We have no reason to believe that the Exchanges will in fact enter
the poison pill debate anytime soon. But this illustration does highlight the potential problems that could arise if the federal government
and the Exchanges are not sensitive to the states' primary role in the
formulation of substantive corporation law."3
Whether or not everyone is entirely happy with the resulting
product, Delaware does have a carefully thought-out model of corporation law-one which corporations and their constituencies are free
to choose or to abandon by going to another state. Delaware takes an
enabling approach, which broadly empowers corporate boards acting
in conformity with their fiduciary duties to cause their corporations to
engage in virtually any lawful activity subject to compliance with relatively flexible statutory constraints."
The statutory constraints on unilateral action that exist in the
Delaware General Corporation Law have been chosen with some care.
They are designed to protect stockholders in situations when the
importance or nature of a transaction seems to require support from
the corporate electorate to prevent abuse and fulfill the legitimate

court held that the provision of the Exchange Act authorizing Exchange Rules had to
be read as addressing certain specified congressional purposes, and not as, sub silentio,
an intention to supplant state corporation laws. Id. at 415. Consistent with that holding, the D.C. Circuit found that "the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include
regulation of an issue that is so far beyond matters of disclosure ... and of the management and practices of self-regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of
corporate governance traditionally left to the states." Id. at 408.
The court also rejected the SEC's claim that it had authority to promulgate the
rule because the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act gave the Commission the
authority to "'facilitate [the] establishment of a national market system for securities.'"
Id. at 415 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (a) (2) (1994)). It refused to read into those
words broad-sweeping authority for the SEC to supplant all state corporate law, stating
that the SEC's "theory can easily federalize corporate law for all companies wishing
access to the national capital markets. Yet nothing in the statute and legislative history
suggests so broad a purpose." Id. The court's reasoning was largely grounded in the
teaching of the United States Supreme Court, found in the landmark case of Santa Fe
Industries v. Green, where the Court stated that corporations "are creatures of state law,
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that,
except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with
respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation."
430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 65, 84
(1975)).
63 See Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 396-99 (arguing that the nation
will suffer if
substantive corporate law is federalized through the SEC and the Exchanges).
64 See Edward S. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (recounting Samuel Arsht's statement that
"[d]irectors of Delaware corporations can do anything they want, as long as it is not
illegal, and as long as they act in good faith").

2003]

THE NEWFEDERALISM OF CORPORA TE GO VERNANCE

977

expectations of the investors. Thus, our law requires stockholder approval for important items such as charter amendments, 6 increases in
66
the corporation's authorized shares,"" certain mergers, 67 and a sale of
substantially all of the corporation's assets. 6 s
Enforcing these statutory safeguards is the common law of fiduciary duty. The preoccupation of that aspect of corporate law has been
the deterrence and remediation of disloyal acts by fiduciaries who use
their position of trust to extract private benefits at the expense of
their corporations' stockholders. 69 The Delaware courts have deployed
a variety of tools for that purpose, including the entire fairness standard of review for conflict transactions and the heightened Revlon7
and Unocal7' standards that are applied to certain director actions in
the mergers and acquisitions context. Within the framework of fiduciary duty review, the Delaware courts have provided strong incentives
for corporate boards to use procedures that are designed to protect
public stockholders.
For instance, our law gives great liabilityinsulating effect to majority-of-the-minority vote provisions and to the
deployment of a special committee of independent directors.7
In
deed, it has long been the case that Delaware law provides a strong

65

66
67

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2001).
§ 242(a) (3).
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2001) (requiring that the board of directors

submit a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation to stockholders for a vote in many circumstances).
68 Id. § 271.
69 See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 passim (Del. 1983) (requiring
fiduciaries who stand on both sides of a transaction to act according to the concept of
entire fairness, which includes fair dealing and fair process); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests.").
70 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 182-84
(Del. 1986) (finding that when directors decide to sell the company, the court may
review whether they have taken reasonable steps to fulfill their sole duty at that point:
to maximize the share price).
71 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (finding
that directors must prove reasonable grounds for believing a threat to the corporation
exists before taking defensive action and may only take action that is reasonable in
relation to the threat posed).
72 For cases addressing the important litigation consequences of special committees and disinterested stockholder approval, see, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys.,
Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117-18 (Del. 1994); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937
(Del. 1985); HarborFinance Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 891, 900-01 (Del. Ch.
1999); In re General Motors Class H ShareholdersLitigation, 734 A.2d 611, 617 (Del. Ch.
1999).
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incentive for companies to comprise their boards with a majority of
independent directors.m7
What Delaware law has resisted, however, is the recitation (by statute or case law) of a detailed set of particular measures that boards
must take, or of certain transactions that boards must avoid, if they are
to act equitably and lawfully. This reticence is not inspired by any
reluctance to hold boards accountable for improper action, as our
case law is replete with examples that refute any assertion of that
kind. 4 Rather, this cautious approach has rested on a belief that there
must be room for creativity and innovation and that the law must accommodate the diversity that exists in corporate America. Restraints
that might be useful and workable when applied to the largest fifty
companies in America might be ill-suited to smaller public companies.
The potency of fiduciary duty review, particularly under the entire
fairness doctrine, and the statutory protections
S
75 given to stockholders
(e.g., appraisal rights) were seen as sufficient, especially when coupled with a corporate election process that gave stockholders an annual opportunity to elect directors.
The Delaware system takes the electoral process seriously, and
76
One
our courts have been vigilant about policing electoral abuse.
See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984) (holding that demand is excused in derivative actions if the plaintiff pleads facts compromising the
independence of a majority of the board).
7, See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1280 (Del.
1988) (finding the board of directors to be "torpid, if not supine" in their actions
requiring application of the entire fairness standard); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (requiring directors to be concerned solely with maximizing shareholder wealth when the sale
of a corporation becomes inevitable); Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (finding a breach of
fiduciary duty when necessary information was withheld from minority shareholders);
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (finding that the directors'
action to advance the shareholders meeting was designed to unlawfully perpetuate
themselves in office and generally reaffirming that an action which complies with a
statute may be struck down if inequitable); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651,
660-63 (Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring directors to provide a compelling justification when
their actions interfere with the shareholder franchise); Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc.,
532 A.2d 1324, 134142 (Del. Ch. 1987) (holding the board of directors liable for
unfair exploitation of a minority stockholder in a merger).
75 This statement subsumes the idea that Delaware's lawmakers and its judges
adapt these protections to address new evolutions, such as the takeover boom of the
last twenty-five years.
76 See Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439 ("The advancement by directors
of the by-law date of
a stockholder's meeting, for [the purpose of obstructing a proxy contest against management], may not be permitted to stand."); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys.
Corp., No. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) ("The right to vote
one's shares is a fundamental aspect of stock ownership governed and protected by
[Delaware law]."); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 344-47 (Del. Ch. 2000)
73
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natural outgrowth of our system's view of corporate democracy has
been a mindset on the part of Delaware policymakers that does not
lightly deprive the stockholders' chosen representatives of managerial
authority. When the matter is debatable and no self-dealing exists, the
decisions of elected boards have been respected. That is the essence
of the business judgment rule.
From the perspective of Delaware and other states, the 2002 Reforms are somewhat problematic because they supplement our principles-based, substantive corporation laws with a variety of specific
requirements
that are not part of any overall system of corporate gov77
ernance. This is not to say that the 2002 Reforms do not bespeak an
overall philosophy of corporate governance; they do. That philosophy
is based on the notion that strong and diligent oversight by independent directors who are required to focus on legal and accounting compliance will result in public companies behaving with integrity. Concomitantly, the 2002 Reforms reflect a belief in the behaviorinfluencing effect of process and disclosure-i.e., by requiring boards
and officers to undertake certain tasks and to certify that they have
done so (or to explain why they have not). Thus, the Reforms aim to
encourage responsible conduct and to deter wrongdoing and imprudent risk-taking.
To two Delaware judges, these beliefs are almost as familiar as the
Lord's Prayer. What is not so familiar is the detail in which the 2002
Reforms prescribe the precise means by which directors and officers
are to pursue certain ends. The Delaware approach has tended to
create incentives for particular good governance practices, yet also
recognizes that what generally works for most boards may not be the
best method for some others. The fiduciary duty form of accountability is well-suited to this sort of flexibility because it is context-specific in
application.

(invalidating a "supermajority bylaw" that would impede the exercise of the shareholder franchise); Blasius,564 A.2d at 659 ("The shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.").
77 Academic and professional commentators have raised concerns
about this
aspect of the 2002 Reforms, as well as the large staff and advisor costs that will be required to implement them. See, e.g., Peter V. Letsou, Flaw and Folly, THEDEAL.cOM
(Oct. 9, 2002) ("[Sarbanes-Oxley] places squarely on public-company investors the
costs of establishing a new bureaucracy (the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board) and of greatly expanding an existing one (the SEC)-even though there is
little reason to believe these new and expanded bodies will be any better.., than
existing regulators."), at http://www.thedeal.com/NASApp/cs/CS?pagename=The
Deal/TDDArticle/StandardArticle&bn=null&c=TDDArticle&cid=1034100864189.
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But because the 2002 Reforms naturally take a more rule-based
form, they come with the risk of codifying (by statute or contract) an
array of procedures that, when implemented in their totality, might be
less than optimal. For present purposes, we highlight two risks of the
2002 Reforms that seem to stand out. First, there is the hazard that
corporate boards will have very little time to concentrate on core
business issues given the various tasks and implementation deadlines
mandated by the Reforms. Second, there is a danger that the 2002
Reforms may be too costly for smaller firms to implement efficiently.
The intense focus of the 2002 Reforms on corporate compliance is
both understandable and praiseworthy. What is a bit more questionable is the expansive reach of the Reforms and their attempt to spell
will ensure the
out precisely the means through which each board
79
integrity.
accounting
and
compliance
goal of legal
By their own terms, the proposed NYSE Rules require several
committees comprised entirely of independent directors with specific
mandates. Once the independent directors have carried out (or at
least "checked the box" on) all of their Reform-mandated duties--on
the audit committee, on the nominating/corporate governance
committee, and on the compensation committee-they may find it
difficult to find time to ponder questions like: Does the company
have a good strategic direction? If it does, how well is the company's
management doing in executing that strategy?

Taken as a whole, the 2002 Reforms impose a host of new obligations on listed
companies which come due at various times of the year. By way of example, auditor
independence requirements became effective in April 2003, subject to transition periods. See Memorandum from Patricia A. Vlahakis et al., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Compliance Reminders (Feb. 7, 2003) (on file with authors)
(indicating the timeframe for compliance with the various requirements of SarbanesOxley). Failure to comply with the strict audit committee standards by this date could
subject an issuer to delisting by the Exchanges, as discussed infra notes 87-88. Provisions requiring enhanced disclosure for non-GAAP financial measures and disclosure
of earnings releases on Form 8-K became effective after March 28, 2003. Id. Various
other disclosures must be included in annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after
July 15, 2003 for most companies, such as Audit Committee "financial expert" disclosure and Code of Ethics disclosure. Id. Record retention requirements take effect on
October 31, 2003. Id. With all of these compliance dates, and many more, contained
within the Act, boards will likely feel great pressure to merely meet the baseline requirements, especially at smaller public corporations. One law firm's compilation of
the required tasks fills a chart spanning five pages and includes another page of proposed rules that still require final rulemaking before their deadlines are established.
Id.
79 See Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 394 (expressing concern that the
NYSE has
"strap [ped] all listed companies into a single model of corporate governance").
78
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Finding the time to think about issues of this kind may be even
harder for smaller public companies that may not be able to afford
extra staff or a host of outside advisors simply to ensure implementation of the 2002 Reforms' mandates. Likewise, these companies may
have more difficulty finding independent directors at an affordable
price. These time demands and cost pressures on smaller public
companies could lead to an increase in going-private transactions, or
to much lower net profitability, as increased advisor and staff costs eat
into cash flow. Even at the largest of companies, it will be a challenge
for boards to organize themselves in an efficient manner that leaves
adequate time for the deep consideration of key business issues and
that does not overly diminish the corporations' coffers. 0
III. SPILLOVER EFFECTS: STATE COURTS WILL SOON FACE FIDUCIARY
DUTY CASES PREMISED ON THE 2002 REFORMS

Because public companies, as a practical matter, cannot opt out of
the 2002 Reforms, their mandates can be seen as reducing the overall
flexibility of the American system of corporate governance. Although
our state has a strong market position, it still faces competition from
other sources of corporate law, a factor which some scholars believe
has contributed to a better product.81 It can be argued, we suppose,
that this type of governance choice could be made available through
competing

Exchange requirements.

We find this a

bit doubtful.

Furthermore, the congressional process is not designed to produce

80

Even well-meaning efforts by the SEC to create flexibility under the new Act

surface this challenge. For example, the SEC has given companies flexibility to have
required reports by attorneys or accountants go to a Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee (QLCC), rather than to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive
officer of the company. Press Release, SEC Adopts Attorney Conduct Rule, supra note
47. But this QLCC must include a member of the audit committee and two other
independent directors. Id. This "flexibility" actually takes away the ability of a board to
create a separate legal compliance committee comprised of independent directors to
address legal compliance matters that do not related to financial or disclosure issues.
Given the substantial new burdens on audit committees and the far-flung compliance
obligations of some big companies, separate committees might make business sense,
not only in terms of allocating scarce director resources, but also in terms of expertise
(i.e., the director who is an expert at accounting might be clueless about CERCLA or
Title VII). As now proposed, however, some very lucky independent director will get
to serve on both the audit and legal compliance committees.
81 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAw 148
(1993) (arguing that state competition over corporate codes has created a "race to the
top"); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theoy of the Corporation, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977) (postulating the original claim that competition
among states to attract corporations results in a "race to the top").
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annual updates, such as have characterized state corporate law, at least
in Delaware. Nor are the Exchanges likely to gin up the energy for an
annual review of their listing requirements.
As a result, corporate America is likely to have to live with the
2002 Reforms for some time. Because the Reforms address boardroom practices traditionally governed by state law but do not, in themselves, constitute a comprehensive body of substantive corporation
law, the Reforms will inevitably begin to influence state law adjudication. One of the important factors supporting this intuition is that
Congress and the Exchanges did not supply forums for the resolution
of implementation disputes at the instance of stockholders.
Unlike Delaware, for instance, the Exchanges do not have ajudicial tribunal that regularly applies corporate governance requirements
to real-world disputes through a fair process that results in written
decisions, which, in turn, provide feedback to policymakers that
stimulates later amendments to the rules. In addition, the Exchanges
have only a very blunt tool to use to ensure compliance: the threat
of delisting or suspending trading in a company's stock.82 Delisting

82 LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 18, § 801.00 ("[S]ecurities
admitted to
the list may be suspended from dealings or removed from the list at any time."). Under the proposed regulations, the NYSE would also wield the power of issuing a "public
reprimand letter to any listed company that violates an NYSE listing standard." NYSE
PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(13); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 24. If such
a public reprimand fails to move a listed company toward compliance, then the NYSE
is left with only two blunt remedies--delisting or suspending trading. Indeed, Delaware judges are sure to hear from the plaintiffs' bar that the significance of a public
reprimand is that a company's board of directors is "risking delisting." In any case,
NYSE Chairman Dick Grasso said in public speeches (e.g., as one of the authors heard
him state at Duke University's Director's Education Institute in October 2002) that the
NYSE will move to delist noncompliant companies for any material violation. See Kimberly Sweet, Firms'DisgraceSpur "Sweeping Reforms," HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Oct.
22, 2002, at Al (summarizing Grasso's speech, which stated that the NYSE would act to
hold corporations accountable for their transgressions).
It is also true, of course, that the SEC may potentially enforce the listing standards
of the Exchanges. The Exchange Act provides that the SEC can bring an action for
violations of, or to command compliance with, the rules of a self-regulatory organization if the organization is unable or unwilling to take appropriate action, or if the
action is "otherwise necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78u(f) (2000). In addition, the SEC has recently proposed a rule that would require the Exchanges to prohibit the listing of securities by
issuers that do not comply with Sarbanes-Oxley's audit committee requirements.
Proposed Audit Committee Standards, supra note 22, at 2638. This proposed rule puts
teeth in section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
As previously discussed, see supra note 62, the extent of the SEC's authority to act
under this authority is, at the very least, uncertain when the Exchange Rule to be
enforced addresses the internal affairs of corporations.

2003]

THE NEW-EDERALISM OFCORPORA TE GOVERNANCE

983

or suspending trading does not punish just the directors who are
responsible for the failures (as fiduciary duty review does); they also
punish the stockholders themselves. Therefore, delisting or suspending trading are likely to be viewed as unsatisfactory remedies from the
point of view of stockholders. And, under preexisting law, stockholders have generally been denied the ability to enforce Exchange Rules
by way of a private right of action under the Exchange Act.8 3 Sarbanes-Oxley contains no provision suggesting that Congress intends
for stockholder-plaintiffs to now be permitted to press such claims.
In fact, Sarbanes-Oxley itself does not, with certain limited exceptions, create new causes of action for stockholders. Rather, as a general matter, the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are to be codified in the
Exchange Act and will be enforced exclusively by the SEC or by federal criminal authorities.84 The inadequacy of delisting as a remedy
83

As a general matter, stockholders attempting to assert a right of action under

the Exchange Act based on a violation of Exchange Rules have been denied standing
to sue. For example, in Walck v. American Stock Exchange, Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 784-86 (3d
Cir. 1982), the court noted that Congress expressly created a private right of action in
sections 9(e), 16(b) and 18 of the Exchange Act, but did not create a private right of
action in section 6. In its decision, the court stated:
The clear implication of the legislative history is that Congress has carefully
studied and "balanced" the competing considerations and enacted the statutory schema that in its view would best serve its various goals of promoting
transactional efficiency, fair dealing, and investor protection, and of limiting
expensive and ineffective federal intervention. We cannot infer in the face of
all this evidence that Congress nonetheless authorized by implication authority in the federal courts to intervene in the self-regulatory system at the instance of an injured investor and grant redress in the form of a monetary
award against an exchange, conditioned on its failure to enforce its own rules,
for the purpose of coercing or encouraging enforcement .... We therefore
conclude that application of the Cort v. Ash standards demonstrates a clear
congressional intent not to create a private damages remedy in § 6.
Id. at 786 (citations omitted).
84 The statute's language
states that:
A violation by any person of this Act, any rule or regulation of the Commission issued under this Act, or any rule of the Board shall be treated for all
purposes in the same manner as a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.) or the rules and regulations issued thereunder,
consistent with the provisions of this Act, and any such person shall be subject
to the same penalties, and to the same extent, as for a violation of that Act or
such rules or regulations.
Sarbanes-Oxley § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7202 (West Supp. 2003). One firm interprets
this provision to mean that:
Except in the case of recovery of profits from prohibited sales during a blackout period and suits by "whistleblowers," [Sarbanes-Oxley] does not expressly
create new private rights of action for civil liability for violations of the Act.
However, the Act potentially impacts existing private rights of action under
the 1934 [Exchange] Act by: (1) lengthening the general statute of limitations
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and the absence of a clear path for aggrieved shareholders to press
claims themselves in the federal courts under the 2002 Reforms may,
therefore, generate new types of state corporate law cases. In our
experience, it is unlikely that stockholder-plaintiffs will be content to
leave enforcement of the 2002 Reforms entirely to the SEC and the
Exchanges. Rather, if history is any guide, the active corporate plaintiffs' bar will be creative and aggressive in deploying the Reforms as a
tool in shareholder litigation under state law.8
After all, unlike the 2002 Reforms, state corporate laws come with
a full-service commitment to enforcement at the behest of stock81
holders who file well-pleaded allegations of breach . State courts are

applicable to private securities fraud actions to the earlier of two years after
discovery of the facts constituting the violation or five years after the violation;
and (2) expanding reporting and disclosure requirements which could potentially expand the range of actions that can be alleged to give rise to private
suits under Sections 10(b) and 18 of the 1934 [Exchange] Act and SEC Rule
lOb-5.
Memorandum from Patricia A. Vlahakis et al., Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, at 5 (July 26, 2002) (on file with authors).
85 In our experience, the effective adjudication of corporate
law disputes requires
a great deal of direct involvement by the trial judge. The factual records in such cases
are often large and make for demanding reading. Moreover, many of these matters
are time-sensitive and involve the application of complex legal doctrines to the evidence in a very short timeframe-a reality that limits the capacity ofjudges to delegate
very much of the work to law clerks.
As we understand it, the federal courts already face a stiff challenge in addressing
their already formidable caseloads. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist has regularly
noted that the federal courts are overworked and has encouraged reforms (e.g., measures to diminish diversity suits) to reduce, rather than increase, their caseloads. See
generally WILLIAM REHNQUIST, U.S. SUPREME COURT, 2002 YEAR-END REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2002
year-endreport.html (last modifiedJan. 2, 2003); Milo Geyelin & Arthur S. Hayes, Chief

Justice Rehnquist Warns About Swamped Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1992, at 14. In
view of that reality, it seems unlikely that the federal courts are well-positioned to
absorb the burden of adjudicating corporate governance disputes now handled by
state courts.
86 Some would note that Delaware courts do not provide a forum
to enforce the
fiduciary duty of care, leaving a gap for others to fill. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1664-65 (2001) (stating that Delaware courts "rarely see
cases and almost never [impose] liability" for breaches of the duty of care). This is, at
best, partially true. Although it is the case that Delaware corporations can adopt charter provisions that immunize directors from damages liability for due care violations,
see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001), this does not preclude courts from
enjoining transactions resulting from grossly negligent board action. More importandy, many exculpatory charter provisions were adopted at mature public companies
with support from sophisticated and activist institutional investors. As Professors Edward Rock and Michael Wachter have noted:
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expected to, and do, resolve all disputes under their codes, including
suits alleging fiduciary misconduct by corporate directors and officers.
Indeed, in the recent past, the Delaware courts have entertained
87
claims touching on Exchange Rules.
For example, our courts have

In the wake of section 102(b)(7), Delaware corporations quickly amended
their certificates of incorporation, and thereby immunized directors from liability under Van Gorkom. These amendments were overwhelmingly approved
by shareholders at a time when shareholding was already concentrated in the
hands of institutions, and at the beginning of the rise of institutional investor
activism. In the years since, as institutional investors have become increasingly
active, there has been no pressure on firms to re-amend their charters to expose their directors to monetary liability for negligent breaches of the duty of
care. This is strong evidence that a judicially enforced duty of care is not in
the shareholders' interests. At the very least, intelligent and sophisticated
shareholders do not think it is in their interests.
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and
InterdoctrinalLegal Transplants,96 Nw. U. L. REV. 651, 659-60 (2002); see also E. Norman
Veasey, The Role of CorporateLitigation in the Twenty-First Century, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131,
147 (2000) ("The strongest support for the principle of self-governance came in the
form of the liability limiting charter provisions that were first authorized in 102(b) (7)
of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Similar provisions have been enacted in
forty-three states and ... routinely approved when presented to shareholders as charter amendments." (citations omitted)). If the federal government wishes to deprive
investors of the right to provide such protection, it must consider whether that intrusion on private ordering makes principled sense, especially because it will tend to
discourage board service.
87 One Delaware case illustrates the limited
utility of Exchange Rules to plaintiffs'
lawyers as a direct route to obtaining relief. In Lennane v. Ask Computer Systems, Inc.,
No. 11744, 1990 WL 154150, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 1990), former-Chancellor Allen
held that stockholder-plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of their corporation's
listing agreement and, therefore, had standing to enforce the agreement as a matter of
contract law. He held that this was so because third party rights are a function of
contract and federal regulation of the securities exchanges does not interfere with
these rights. See id. ("I decide the current motion on the assumption that the federal
regulation of securities exchanges does not itself preclude a shareholder from enforcing terms of a listing agreement intended to benefit shareholders. I assume also that
shareholders are third party beneficiaries of... the terms of a securities listing agreement."). But the right to sue that Chancellor Allen recognized was of dubious value,
because he observed that a stockholder's only remedy for a breach of the listing
agreement as a contract was the same as that available to the direct party to the listing
agreement, the Exchange-i.e., delisting:
What third party rights are created by a contract is obviously a function of the
contract itself. Here the parties to the listing agreement have negotiated the
remedy for breach of the terms of the agreement: delisting. It seems plain to
me that the NASD itself could not specifically enforce by court order its
shareholder voting by-law. Rather the remedy for its breach appears to be
limited to delisting of the offending corporation's securities ....If this is the
case, as I now believe, then it should be apparent that others-even if they be
intended beneficiaries-can have no greater rights.
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held that plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty when
directors were alleged to have delisted the company's stock in order to
further an inequitable purpose. s For that reason, those of us who
serve on state courts may be among the first to hear shareholder
grievances based on the requirements of the 2002 Reforms.
One form that these cases may take could involve claims that directors are breaching their fiduciary duties by not complying with the
2002 Reforms. The plaintiffs' arguments will likely come in two varieties. The most straightforward will be that Delaware's common law
ought to embrace the substance of a feature of the Reforms (e.g., the
Reforms' definition of independent director or the Reforms' requirement for independent director approval of certain transactions).
The more indirect route will be an allegation that directors breach
their fiduciary duties by exposing the corporation (and, therefore, its
stockholders) to an injurious sanction (e.g., delisting) by not adhering
to the Reforms.

88

A corporation's directors have the power to cause a corporation to withdraw its

listing and registration with securities exchanges in their proper exercise of business
judgment. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. Nozko, No. 13014, 1994 WL 413299, at *6 (Del Ch.
July 26, 1994) ("Delaware law... recognizes the power of the issuing corporation's
directors, in a proper exercise of their business judgment, to cause the corporation to
[withdraw its securities listing] even if, as an incidental matter, the delisting and deregistration might adversely impact the market for the corporation's securities."); Lennane,
1990 WL 154150, at *6 ("[T]he corporation may voluntarily delist its securities at any
time."). But when the power is exercised for an inequitable purpose, the fiduciary
analysis becomes interesting. In Hamilton, the court of chancery found that stockholder-plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because they alleged that
the delisting, which eliminated the market for their stock and forced them to convey
their stock at an unfair price, was undertaken for self-interested purposes. 1994 WL
413299, at *18-21. Similarly, in Seagraves v. Urstadt Prperty Co., No. 10307, 1989 WL
17918 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1989), the plaintiff-stockholders were able to withstand a motion to dismiss because they properly alleged a claim for unfair dealing in relation to
the wrongful delisting of their stock. Id. at *4. Because the delisting was allegedly part
of a scheme to lower the market price of the company's stock so the company could
force a cash-out merger at an unfair price, the court found that this inequitable purpose could form the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Id.
In another case, defendant directors threatened to delist the shares of the company's stock if a self-tender offer for the company's preferred stock proposed by the
company's president did not succeed. Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d
1051, 1061-62 (Del. Ch. 1987). This threat was held to be coercive of a stockholder's
decision whether to tender. Id. at 1061-62. The court held that when a corporation
goes beyond simply informing the stockholders of the possibility of delisting and deregistration, and instead threatens that it "intends to request" a delisting of its shares,
such a disclosure "tips the balance and impels the Court to find that the Offer, even if
benignly motivated, operates in an inequitably coercive manner." Id. at 1062.
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There will be some legitimate pressure on state courts to respond
with a measure of receptivity to these arguments. After all, there is
something to be said for harmonizing state standards with the 2002
Reforms when that can be achieved fairly and efficiently. And why,
plaintiffs' lawyers will ask, shouldn't state courts require directors to
ensure that their companies do not run afoul of the Exchanges, when
that is necessary to guarantee listing of the company's shares?89 Isn't
there a fiduciary duty to avoid this kind of harsh penalty? Or, relatedly, to make sure that the corporation doesn't engage in a transaction that violates Sarbanes-Oxley?90
Through arguments of this kind, state courts may soon find themselves immersed in the implementation of the 2002 Reforms, even
though their own state laws are not directly implicated. In this process, the gravitational effect of the Reforms' existence will nudge state
judges to align their own state corporate systems to avoid whipsawing
corporate directors with incompatible dictates. At the same time, this
process will generate opportunities for state judges to deepen the
dialogue with policymakers at the Exchanges and in the federal government. In particular, the resolution of actual disputes may shed
light on the utility of the 2002 Reforms and reveal whether they are
compatible, in their present form, with the enabling systems of corporate law that are employed by Delaware and most other states.
In the remaining parts of this Article, we examine a few specific
subjects that provide good examples of how the 2002 Reforms may
require adaptive responses by the states that may reflect pressure back
on the sources of the Reforms to modify their initial scope and shape.
IV. HARMONIC CONVERGENCE OR TRAIN WRECK?: THE 2002 REFORMS'
DEFINITION OF AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR

The 2002 Reforms contain a relatively pristine definition of independent director-one that builds on the best practice recommendations of many shareholder activists. Although this definition is not in
all respects identical to preexisting state law, the concerns the definition seeks to address are ones that state law has always considered
important. The common law of corporations is suspicious of directors
who hold managerial positions or who are beholden to management

89 Cf Eisenberg, 537 A.2d at 1062 (finding actionable
coercion when a board
threatened to seek delisting if a transaction was not approved).
90 Cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2001) (denying
exculpation for acts

or omissions involving a knowing violation of law).
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for consulting contracts or other valuable things. 9' Although the degree of scrutiny of such ties has long been a subject of some controversy, the legitimacy of concerns about such ties is universally acknowledged.
In one important way, the 2002 Reforms are likely to simplify state
law adjudication. By way of example, consider the common question
of demand excusal in a typical case involving a transaction between
the corporation and its Chairman and CEO. By requiring a majority
of independent directors without compromising ties to management
or the corporation,9 2 the 2002 Reforms make it more likely that Delaware courts will not have to make as many difficult categorical judgments about particular directors at the pleading or injunctive stages of
cases. For the most part, it should be the case that satisfaction of the
new Exchange Rule independence standards will enable a director, at
least as a prima facie matter, to be labeled as "independent."
It would be Panglossian to believe, however, that the 2002 Reforms will answer all such questions. Notably, the Exchange Rules
continue to permit an "independent director" who is not on the audit
committee to enter consulting or other arrangements with the company so long as the other independent directors conclude the arrangements are not material. 93 Quite obviously, the Exchanges contemplate that board votes excusing such economic arrangements as
inconsequential are likely to be rare, if they occur at all. Nonetheless,
there remains some play in the joints. On balance, however, the
frown that the 2002 Reforms cast at independence-compromising
familial, personal, and financial ties comports with Delaware's view of
best practice and will reduce the scope for litigable controversy about
director status.
This does not mean that state law will (or should) bend completely to the 2002 Reforms' articulation of the independent director

91 See, e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,
936-37 (Del. 1993) (analyzing the
independence of two directors "in light of their employment with entities affiliated
with [management/inside directors]"); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del. Ch.
2002) (finding that the disinterest of two directors was potentially compromised when
one director stood to lose substantial consulting fees and the other owned a company
that stood to gain in fees if the challenged transaction closed); see also supra note 13
(summarizing Delaware's treatment of the effect of consulting contracts to independent directors).
See supra Part 1.B (discussing the qualifications of an "independent
director"
under Sarbanes-Oxley and the proposed Exchange Rules).
93 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2)
(a); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3,
at 7; NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R. 4200(a) (15).
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concept. One of the disadvantages of the common law-its slow evolution and sensitivity to context-also has offsetting benefits. Under
the evolutionary common law approach, hard definitions emerge only
after multiple tests and remain subject to alteration. The Reforms
exemplify the nearly opposite characteristics of legislative reform, by
displaying both the impressive scope of rapid change that can be
achieved in that manner and the potential costs of a system-wide imposition of ideas that have not been proven bug-free. In at least a
couple of areas, the common law of corporations must pause before
fully yielding to the 2002 Reforms' treatment of the independent director concept. We discuss these situations next.
A. Is Ownership by Directors a Good Thing?
One feature of the 2002 Reforms' definition of an independent
director clashes with Delaware's view of best practice. The Reforms'
definition appears to be grounded in a belief that the attribute viewed
by Delaware law and many academic commentators as a positive
thing-ownership or affiliation with the owner of a significant, but not
controlling,block of company stock 9 -casts doubt on a director's independence. What many have seen as the best evidence of a good
faith incentive to monitor-a real equity stake in the corporation, or,
as Ross Perot would say, "skin in the game"-is instead a taint that, at

For a sampling of cases in which the Delaware courts found that the directors'
ownership of significant amounts of stock tended to align their interests with the other
stockholders, see Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1379 (Del.
1995); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 709 (Del. Ch. 2001); In reIXC Communications, Inc. v. CincinnatiBell, Inc., No. 17324, 1999 WL 1009174, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct.
27, 1999). See also R. Franklin Balotti et al., Equity Ownership and the Duty of Care: Convergence, Revolution, or Evolution ?, 55 Bus. LAw. 661, 692 (2000) ("[B]y increasing the
equity holdings of board members, the result should be improved corporate performance."); Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management
Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885, 913-17 (1999) (finding "a significant correlation between
the amount of stock owned by individual outside directors and firm performance");
Charles M. Elson, Executive Compensation-A Broad-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937,
981-83 (arguing that when directors own stock, "their interests and thinking [are realigned] with those of the shareholders," making them capable of more effectively
bargaining with management on issues such as management compensation); J. Travis
Laster, Exorcising the Omnipresent Specter: The Impact of Substantial Equity Ownership by
Outside Directors on Unocal Analysis, 55 Bus. LAW. 109, 126-34 (stating that the likely
result of having directors with "substantial equity holdings" is "an increase in the overall quality of director decision making"). We emphasize that in using the work "stock,"
we mean actual stock holdings, not options.
94
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best, can be explained away, freeing a stockholder-director to be an
"independent director" for some, but not all, purposes. 95
This is the necessary implication of a fair reading of the 2002 Reforms, starting with Sarbanes-Oxley itself. For purposes of service on
the audit committee, a director is deemed independent by SarbanesOxley only if he is not an "affiliated person" of the company or one of
96
its subsidiaries. Even under the SEC's proposed, looser definition of
the term than existed previously under the Exchange Act,97 a director
who owns, or is affiliated with any stockholder who owns, ten percent or more of the company's shares could be deemed an affiliated

95 Recent evidence regarding the positive
effect on corporate performance (as
measured by stock price) of having relatively long-term owners who held significant
but non-controlling blocks of stock is inconclusive. See generally Sanjai Bhagat et al.,
Relational Investing and Firm Performance,27J. FIN. RES. (forthcoming 2004) (explaining
that the first large-scale test of the hypothesis that relational investing affects corporate
performance provided a mixed answer). Notably, this study did not involve an examination of whether corporations whose boards contain representatives of such longterm owners perform better; it only involved whether having such owners as stockholders had any measurable effect on share price. Id. at 11-12. The study also does
not focus on another factor, which is more difficult to measure-whether the presence
of such owners has any positive effect in improving corporate integrity and compliance. A positive effect of this kind might not do much to increase stock price in any
particular period, but might be wealth-creating over the longer term.
The study, however, does deepen the dilemma faced by advocates for stronger
monitoring by long-term institutional holders, because the authors of the study found
institutions tended to hold short-term positions, a reality in part exemplified by the
authors' core definition of a relational investor as one that holds a significant position
for at least four years. Id. at 9-10. Of course, this is but one of many factors that perceptive scholars have identified as limiting the ability and, as important, the incentives
for institutional investors to actively monitor their portfolio companies. See generally
Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MIcH.
L. REv. 520 (1990); Bernard S. Black, The Value of InstitutionalInvestor Monitoring: The
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus
Control: The InstitutionalInvestor as CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991);
Jill E. Fisch, RelationshipInvesting: Will it Happen? Will it Work ? 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009
(1994).
96 Sarbanes-Oxley § 301, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (m) (3) (B) (West
Supp. 2003).
97 See Proposed Audit Committee Standards, supra note 22, at
2641 ("For purposes
of the proposed rule, we propose to define the terms 'affiliate' and 'affiliated person'
consistent with our other definitions of these terms under the securities laws, such as
in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2 and Securities Act Rule 144, with an additional safe harbor."). The SEC sought input relating to this safe harbor by asking the following questions: "Is the proposed definition of 'affiliated person' for non-investment companies
appropriate? Is the proposed safe harbor from the definition of affiliated person
appropriate? Should it include fewer or more persons?" Id. at 2642; see also Exchange
Act § 3(a) (19), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a) (11) (A) (2000) (using the lower five percent threshold to define "affiliated person").
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person and therefore be ineligible to serve as a voting member of the
audit committee. "8
In effect, this means that a venture capital firm that owns fifteen
percent of a public company and does not participate in management
is disqualified from having a representative on the audit committee.
Ditto for a leveraged buyout firm with twenty-four percent of a company's equity, but no managerial role. As a result, these investorswho have a strong incentive to monitor managerial rent-seeking at the
expense of the firm-are disabled from participating in the committee primarily charged with ensuring the financial integrity of the firm.
It is true that Sarbanes-Oxley does not contain any overarching
definition of independent director, and, therefore, leaves directors
affiliated with large stockholders free to serve as independent directors in other capacities, subject only to Exchange Rule and state law
constraints. But the Exchange Rule provisions of the 2002 Reforms
do not lift the shadow cast over owner-directors by Sarbanes-Oxley.
Admittedly, as a general matter, the NYSE's definition of independence does not preclude a major but non-controlling stockholder from
being considered an independent director. In intellectual harmony
with Sarbanes-Oxley, however, the original NYSE Report recommended that directors affiliated with a stockholder holding more than
twenty percent of the company's shares could not serve as a voting
member on the audit committee. 9 NASDAQ took a similar view and
continues to adhere to this requirement for audit committee members.1 °° The NYSE proposal was ultimately abandoned in view of the
outright ban on participation by such stockholders contained within
Sarbanes-Oxley. Nonetheless, both the original NYSE proposal and
the still-live NASDAQ one betray a suspicion of owner-directors and
doubts about whether it is possible to distinguish between a substantial owner who does not exercise and reap private benefits of control
(such as salaries and management fees) from those who do.
In fairness, the twenty percent threshold each Exchange embraced
can be seen as an attempt to allow some flexibility for owner-directors

98

See Proposed Audit Committee Standards, supra note 22, at 2641 (defining the

proposed audit committee member independent requirements); see also Exchange Act,
§ 3(a)(19), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a) (11) (A) (2000) (incorporating the lower five percent
threshold of the Investment Company Act of 1940 § (2)(a)(3) to define an "affiliated
person").
99 NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(6) cmt. n.6; NYSE REPORT,
supra
note 3, at 11.
100NASDAQ Proposed Amendments, supra note 3, R. 4350(d) (3)
(a).
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while setting a limit above which suspicions about control should predominate. Even when their proposal is read in this manner, the Exchanges have cast a shadow over directors affiliated with blockholders. For example, the NYSE Report's acknowledgement that a
director affiliated with a non-controlling stockholder owning twenty
percent or more of the company's shares can be independent for nonaudit committee purposes is expressed in a most begrudging way: a
statement that such an affiliation should not be a per se bar to an
independence finding."' This phraseology is perhaps not troublesome
if taken literally, but its spirit seems broader. And there can be no
doubt it will be read that way by the plaintiffs' bar.
In this regard, the 2002 Reforms motivate us to ask: have the Reforms cut off the most promising new source of independent directors
to animate the best practice model now required of corporate America? By their plain terms, the 2002 Reforms evince a distrust of directors affiliated with holders of significant but non-controlling blocks of
company stock. They disable the ability of directors affiliated with
venture capitalists and certain institutional investors to serve on audit
committees, and make them suspect if they are chosen to fill other
board roles usually reserved for independent directors. This incentive
system is contrary to much good thinking in academia and in Delaware decisional law, both of which have taken the view that independent directors who have a substantial stake as common stockholders in
the company's success are better motivated to diligently and faithfully
oversee management.
A natural source of talent exists within the ranks of America's institutional investor community, which controls a large portion of this
country's equity holdings. To date, there has been a reluctance on
the part of many institutional investors and many money management firms to "walk the walk" of good corporate governance.
Although these firms "talk the talk" and regularly advocate better
board-room practices, and although they stress their status as "longterm stockholders," they in fact provide few representatives to
serve as directors on public company boards. Warren Buffett remains

101See NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(2) (a) cmt. ("[T]he Exchange
does not view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by itself, as a bar to an
independence finding."); NYSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 ("We do not view ownership, or affiliation with the owner, of a less than controlling amount of stock as a per se
bar to an independence finding.").
102 For a good summary of both the case law and the academic literature,
see R.
Franklin Balotti et al., supra note 94.
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a relatively lonely example of a money manager willing to stand and
be counted as a fiduciary.
Furthermore, most Americans participate in the stock market indirectly via money managers-a reality that is unlikely to change. One
of the central problems of corporate law has always been how to create a system whereby diffuse stockholders feel comfortable entrusting
their capital to centralized management. The emergence of a class of
institutions (pension funds, mutual fund managers, venture capitalists, etc.) who act as a centralizing force between the ultimate source
of capital (individuals) and the corporations that employ it has consequences for our system. If the appropriate incentives are created,
representatives of many of these intermediate aggregators of capital
are well-positioned to increase investor confidence in the market because these aggregators can act as more effective stockholdermonitors than individual investors. The full potential of these institutions, however, will not be realized if the system creates-rather than
seeks to aggressively knock down-barriers to their responsible par103
ticipation as independent directors.
Indeed, by sidelining representatives of these institutions that hold about half of the stock of America's large public companies,10 4 our society will be benching a large

103 Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, this topic warrants careful
consideration by groups like the Council of Institutional Investors. Implemented with
care, an industry-wide commitment to board service could be beneficial, efficient, and
useful in overcoming "free-rider" incentives. If these institutions are truly long-term
holders, they, like Buffett, should be willing to have representatives serve on a responsible number of boards. This would actually increase the real-world experiences of
these money managers (perhaps increasing their effectiveness as stock-pickers) and
improve the overall monitoring capacity of the system (a more generalized good for
investors). Federal and state law barriers to responsible participation of this kind
should be studied and removed, but as distinguished scholars have noted, these barriers are not so formidable as to present a real barrier to institutions seeking to play a
more full-bodied role in the nomination and election of directors. See RonaldJ. Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the OutsideDirector: An Agendafor InstitutionalInvestors,
43 STAN. L. REv. 863, 905 (1991) (arguing that, under existing legal rules, institutional
investors could work together to identify qualified independent directors who would
be nominated with the specific charge of being independent of management and
accountable for advancing shareholder interests). To the extent the reader perceives
that we are somewhat dubious of the system's ability to create after-the-fact "owners"
out of new independent directors with no previous equity stake, the reader is not
wrong. Indeed, the methods by which such "stakes" are created-stock option grants
or stock purchases-often generate controversy themselves.
104 See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 61 (2001) ("U.S.
institutional investors, who
owned only 7.2% of all equities in 1950, now hold a total of $6.4 trillion, or 46.7% of
outstanding equities."), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2001_factbook_06.pdf;
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, LeavingMoney on the Table: Do InstitutionalInvestors
Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855-56 (2002)
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pool of talent and, arguably, one whose members have the healthiest
incentive to be good directors.
Regrettably, this incentive for institutional representatives to avoid
direct responsibility through service on corporate boards may well
come as welcome news to even the most aggressive activists in the institutional ranks. Many of these institutions are reluctant to have their
representatives serve. 1°5 They see such service as costly, liabilitygenerating, and flexibility-reducing. Why, they ask, would we serve on
a board when that could limit our fund's ability to dump the company's stock?
Their narrow frame of reference should, if anything, be enlarged,
not given validation. The clients of institutions holding diverse portfolios of enormous size have an interest in the integrity of the overall
system. 6 To the extent that the institutional investor community
("[F]inancial institutions own nearly 50% of the equity securities listed on the [NYSE]
and account for approximately 75% of the daily trading volume on the NYSE. The
ownership and trading percentages are equally high for securities listed on [the
NASDAQ] ." (footnotes omitted)); Jayne E. Zanglein, From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street
Talk: The ChangingFace of Corporate Governance, 11 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 43, 45 (1998)
("Collectively, all institutional investors, including pension funds, control about sixty
percent of the stock of the one thousand largest U.S. public corporations." (citation
omitted)).
105For example, consider the reluctance of mutual funds to
disclose even the
policies and procedures they follow when voting proxies related to the portfolio securities they hold and the votes they cast. Cf Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy
Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564
(Feb. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274) (amending portions
of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act to require
disclosure about how registered management investment companies vote proxies
regarding their portfolio securities). Rather than supporting the new SEC rule, the
mutual funds largely mounted a solid wall of resistance to it, claiming that it did not
benefit stockholders and that it was too costly for the funds to implement. See, e.g., id.
at 6568 (noting that "many commentators, including a large number of fund industry
participants, strongly opposed any requirement for a fund to provide disclosure of its
actual proxy votes cast."); Ira Carnahan, Fund Companies Fight Disclosure, FORBES.COM
(Dec. 11, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/2002/12/l1/cz ic 1211beltway-print
.html (discussing the resistance of "big fund companies such as the Vanguard Group
and Fidelity Investments, as well as the Investment Company Institute, the mutual fund
trade group" to the new SEC proxy voting disclosure rule); Press Release, Matthew P.
Fink, President, Investment Company Institute, ICI Statement on SEC Proxy Vote
Disclosure Rule (Jan. 23, 2003), at http://www.ici.org/issues/corp/arc-reg/03-newsproxy-final.html (expressing the Investment Company Institute's objections to the
new SEC rule because it "overreaches, and is more likely to harm than help fund
shareholders" and "will produce no additional benefits while encouraging the politicization of mutual fund portfolio management").
106 One of the (rightfully) most respected business leaders
in America is mutual
fund innovatorJohn Bogle. In recent speeches emphasizing the need for reform and
increased activism by institutional investors, Bogle embraces many of our premises.
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First, he makes the obvious point that institutional holders in general, and mutual
funds in particular, are by a large margin the predominant holders of stock in our
economy. SeeJohn C. Bogle, After The Fall: What Lies Ahead for Capitalism and the
Financial Markets?, Address at the University of Missouri (Oct. 22, 2002) [hereinafter
Bogle, After the Fall] (noting that there are approximately 9000 funds with assets
exceeding $5.5 trillion), available at http://www.vanguard.com/boglesite/sp20021022
.html;John C. Bogle,Just When We Need It Most... Is Corporate Governance Letting
Us Down?, Remarks to the New York Society of Security Analysts (Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Bogle,Just When We Need It Most] (remarking that stock ownership is concentrated in mutual funds), available at http://www.vanguard.com/boglesite/sp
20020214.html.
Second, Bogle's creed as an investment advisor is that investors cannot expect to
beat the market average and that, in the long run, investors do not succeed by shortterm trading moves, but through investments in good companies that pay off over
time. Indeed, because Bogle believes that investors cannot beat the market over time,
he is the leading advocate for investing in indexed portfolios that reflect broad market
segments (e.g., the S&P 500). Therefore, it is logical to assume, as his emphasis on
corporate governance indicates, that he believes that the integrity of the capital markets as a whole is critical to investor well-being. See Bogle, After the Fall, supra (encouraging investors to let themselves be idealistic and to play a role in corporate goverance); Bogle, Just When We Need It Most, supra (emphasizing the important
failures in corporate governance that contributed to the recent stock market decline
and stating that "[i]t seems self-evident that the financial strength of our citizeninvestors, our securities markets, and indeed our nation will be well-served by a return
to full disclosure, sound financial statements, and corporate integrity"). Without active
involvement by stockholders as owners of stock, directors cannot be relied upon as a
sufficient safeguard. See id. ("If we can't rely on the directors to govern, who can we
rely on? Why the stockholders!").
Third, he concedes that the mutual fund industry and other institutional investors
have been less than ideally active stockholders. He seeks to create a "Federation of
Long-Term Investors" to correct this problem. See Bogle, After the Fall, supra (observing that investors "remain ill-served by the passive governance policies of most funds");
John C. Bogle, Memorandum to: Financial Intermediaries Re: How We Can Profit
From the Experience of Corporate America, Remarks to the Annual Conference of the
American Life Insurance Council (Oct. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Bogle, Memorandum to
Financial Intermediaries] ("We [the mutual fund industry] have failed to recognize
that ownership entails not only rights but responsibilities, and as a result have failed to
act as good corporate citizens."), available at http://www.vanguard.com/bogle-site/
sp20021014.html.
Fourth, Bogle believes that institutional investors have the wherewithal to be powerfully influential stockholders, if they choose to do so. See Bogle,Just When We Need
It Most, supra (proposing that fund managers work together to influence corporate
decision making). Finally, Bogle argues that mutual funds can cut their costs in many
ways that would be more beneficial to investors, which would free up some funds to use
toward increased stockholder activism. See Bogle, After the Fall, supra (arguing that
only a small portion of management fees is actually used on fund management).
If all these premises are correct, the case for participation on boards by money
managers seems to have some logical force behind it. And if, as John Coffee commented to us, it may be more feasible for institutions to identify director candidates to
put up for election so as to avoid concerns about securities liability, then some variant
of the idea presented by Professors Ronald and Kraakman could be implemented
instead by the institutions. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 103, at 905 (arguing
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steps up to the plate as a whole, it can contribute a useful supply of
talented directors without placing an enormous stress on itself. By
sharing the load through an industry-wide commitment to service, the
institutional investor community could greatly improve the monitoring capacity of corporate boards, to the overall benefit of their clients
as investors in diversified portfolios of stock. 0 7 Unfortunately, the
2002 Reforms do not challenge market intermediaries to accept
greater responsibility but, instead, provide them with another excuse
to leave the actual hard work of governing corporations to others.
B. Label with Care: The Dangers of Careless Use of the 2002 Reforms'
Definition of Independent Directors
The 2002 Reforms' tightening of the definitional standards for
independent directors will exert leverage on Delaware and other state
courts in a less obvious, but quite important, way. The momentum in
favor of the independent director concept has, at times, led courts to
be less than careful about terminology and about separating out a
director's status for purposes of articulating the appropriate standard
of review to apply to a transaction from the distinct question of
whether that director in fact breached his fiduciary duties in a manner
that subjects him to monetary liability.'O" Not only that, many corporate decisions involve a court's examination of whether a particular
transaction should be enjoined or rescinded, and do not involve
claims for monetary damages against specific directors. The rhetoric
used in such decisions is situation-specific and is of doubtful utility
when extended to decisions requiring a director-by-director determination of culpability.

that institutions should identify, nominate, and elect professional directors responsive
and accountable to stockholders, not management). The electoral reform discussed
infra Part V would also tend to make such activism more affordable.
If institutions do not take up this cause, then the reality is that boards will be
dominated by independent directors who, by the 2002 Reforms' definition, will have
little personal stake in the corporation, and by dint of institutional passivity, will have
few ties of loyalty to the electorate. Whether this is a good reality is a question that can
be debated another day, but reality it will be.
107 As Professors Gilson and Kraakman note, "[t]he
surest way to increase the
value of an indexed stock portfolio is to increase the value of all of the companies in
the portfolio." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 103, at 867. To do this, Gilson and
Kraakman suggest that the indexed institutional investors should seek a corporate
governance system that will improve the monitoring of management system-wide. Id.
108 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,
362 (Del. 1993) (containing a section heading entitled "When a Director's Duty of Independence is
Breached for Purposes of Rebutting the Rule").
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Stated more concretely, labels like independent director are important but must be utilized responsibly. For example, it makes perfect sense at the pleading stage to examine whether, based on the
pleaded facts, a majority of the relevant board is capable of acting
independently on a demand that the corporation bring suit against a
senior officer. In that situation, a first-blush look at independence is
an efficient way to make reasoned demand excusal decisions. Likewise, when one of the directors is "interested" in a transaction, a consideration of whether the other directors have ties to him that might
render it difficult for them to act impartially on the transaction is a
rational step to determining the appropriate level ofjudicial scrutiny
to apply to the transaction.
It is problematic, however, if these prima facie labels are given
weight in the determination of whether particular directors are subject to monetary liability. Remembering the difference between the
concepts of an "interested" director and of an "independent" director
is vital. Fundamentally, a director is "interested" in a transaction when
he possesses a personal financial stake that is adverse to the interests
of the company and its stockholders.'0 9 In a case of that kind, the interested director is always at risk that the standard of review might, for
various reasons, be the test of entire fairness. In that circumstance,
the interested director must be prepared to remedy any injury to the
corporation (through rescission or damages) in the event that the
transaction was not accomplished on the same terms as a properly
negotiated, arm's-length deal. '10
The independence concept addresses a subtly different concern,
which is that directors who lack a personal self-interest might be beholden (financially or personally) to someone who is interested, and

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001). By statute, an "interest" exists when
a
director also serves as an officer or director of a party (such as a controlling stockholder) that has a conflicting interest. Id. This part of the statutory definition is closer
to the evolving concept of independence. Because of the likelihood of parent company indemnification for such directors in cases involving alleged unfair dealing with a
subsidiary, the categorical label may not be as important for these directors and there
may be policy reasons justifying the stronger "interested" designation.
10 Delaware's exculpation statute expressly recognizes this, in particular by denying exculpation whenever a director has received an improper personal benefit, and
more generally by denying exculpation for loyalty violations. Id. § 102(b)(7). As a
matter of long-standing doctrine, when an interested transaction is deemed unfair, the
interested director is deemed to have breached his duty of loyalty. See, e.g., In re The
Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 17148, 2002 WL 537692, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27,
2002) (refusing to dismiss a claim that six interested directors breached their duties of
loyalty because the interested transactions appeared unfair).
109
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therefore be incapable of ensuring that any transaction with the interested party is fair to the corporation. Simply because a director possesses ties to an interested director, thus causing the court to presumptively consider the director non-independent, does not mean
that the director in fact acted improperly. A finding that a director is
not, by reason of personal or financial relationships, independent
does not equate to a finding of breach of fiduciary duty.
To the contrary, when the personal liability of corporate directors
is at issue, a further individualized finding is required as to each director. In that process, the court is required to determine whether the
director acted with the requisite level of culpability to justify a damage
award. In most cases, this will entail an examination of whether the
director acted in a manner that is outside the exculpatory protection
of the corporation's certificate of incorporation by breaching the duty
of loyalty. This exercise necessarily requires the court to consider
factors bearing on the director's partiality, but not as an end in themselves. Instead, such factors are relevant to, but not dispositive of, the
court's determination of whether the director acted with the necessary
state of mind (e.g., with an absence of good faith)' to justify the imposition of damages, irrespective of whether the director is insulated
for damages for negligence. A director with potentially compromising
ties to an interested director might have discharged his duties with
entire fidelity. And a director with no suspicious connections to an
interested director might be found to have consciously abdicated his
responsibilities, thereby having acted in bad faith.
A related but distinct issue also exists. Under the 2002 Reforms,
the status of "independent director" is generally imposed in a blanket
manner that is not transaction-specific. This labeling could have an
unfair effect if extended into the litigation context without appropriate sensitivity. There may well be situations in which the CEO of a
company is entirely capable of acting "independently" on an issue
because his management status (and presumed desire to keep it) has
no bearing at all on his incentives.
After the 2002 Reforms, it will be even more important for courts
to bear these realities in mind and not to allow the necessarily nuanced and fact-driven consideration of whether particular human
beings must pay damages to be replaced by an overly simple inquiry
into status. Otherwise, well-qualified people may be dissuaded from
serving on boards, to the resulting detriment of stockholders.

II

§ 102(b) (7) (ii).
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V. THE DIRECTOR ELECTION PROCESS:
THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT TO REFORM?

Another related issue provoked by the 2002 Reforms is whether or
not it is time for state and federal policymakers to examine the management-biased corporate election system. After the 2002 Reforms, it
is unquestionable that Delaware, the Exchanges, and the federal government each have policies that express the belief that genuinely independent directors who owe their allegiances entirely to the corporation and its stockholders are valuable to investors. In particular, the
proposed NYSE Rule that demands that the nominating process be
exclusively the province of independent directors reflects this view."'
If this philosophy is so central to our system of corporate governance, one can rightly ask why the current incumbent-biased corporate
election process should be perpetuated. As of now, incumbent slates
are able to spend their companies' money in an almost unlimited way
in order to get themselves reelected. 13 As a practical matter, this renders the corporate election process an irrelevancy, unless a takeover
proposal is on the table and a bidder is willing to fund an insurgent
slate. The aberrational cases in which shareholder activists have actually mounted proxy contests tend to 4prove the incumbent bias of the
system, rather than cast doubt on it.
Although it would seem to promise more expense than protection
to investors to create incentives for lively electoral disputes on an annual basis, it is equally questionable whether the current balance is
optimal. Even with the advent of independent nominating committees, there will remain the danger that incumbent slates will become
overly comfortable in their positions and that even putatively independent directors will become less than ideally sensitive to stockholder input. A balance of the efficient deployment of corporate
resources (i.e., costs) against the utility of a genuinely open election

112

NYSE PROPOSED RULES, supra note 3, § 303A(4) (a) cmt.; see also NYSE REPORT,

supra note 3, at 9 ("Placing this responsibility in the hands of an independent nominating.., committee can enhance the independence and quality of nominees.")
11 See, e.g., Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457
A.2d 339, 345 (Del. 1983) (holding that the "management group... was entitled to use corporate funds to present its
position" in a proxy election).
114 In a recent case, shareholder activists funded
a two-year campaign to replace a
majority of the board of ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a company dominated by Milan
Panic. Although ultimately successful, they incurred millions of dollars in costs. See
Greg Levine, Faces in the News, FORBES.COM (May 30, 2002) (describing investors' efforts to elect three sympathetic board members), at http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/
30/0530facesam print.html.
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process that generates increased accountability might be reflected in a
biennial or triennial system of elections that requires equal access to
the proxy machinery between incumbents and insurgents with significant (e.g., five or ten percent) nominating support.
Through this means, Delaware could invigorate its system of corporate democracy without undue cost and create a more secure foundation for the 2002 Reforms. The very fact that an open process is
created would influence independent directors to be more responsive
on an ongoing basis and to consult with key stockholder constituencies in shaping the management slate. Put differently, by facilitating
fair contests, the new rules of the game will cut down on the need for
them.
This is, of course, not a novel proposal.1 1 5 Its implementation
would also require a sensitive corresponding reaction by the SEC, to
enable disaggregated investors to communicate in a non-burdensome
manner in the electoral process. Reform along these lines needs to be
carefully thought out, of course. The reality that thoughtful deliberation on this front is warranted cannot obscure an equally apparent
reality: the rhetorical analogy of our system of corporate governance
to republican democracy will ring hollow so long as the corporate
election process
is so tilted toward the self-perpetuation of incumbent
6
directors."
To grasp why this is so, it is useful to consider the delicate subject
of executive compensation. As we have explained, the American system of corporate governance involves a dialogue among the federal
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See, e.g.,
MELVIN

EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION

117-21

(1976) (proposing the establishment of an open election process between incumbent
directors and challengers); William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the ConceptualDivide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1072 (2002) (proposing
triennial directorial elections and providing equal access to the proxy machinery for
stockholders having at least five percent of the company's voting power); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial
Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 231 (1991) (proposing a quinquennial
meeting structure which grants free access to corporate proxy machinery to any stockholder or group of stockholders with at least five percent of the outstanding shares or
shares having an aggregate market value of five million).
116 The adoption of this proposal might also be accompanied
by another reform to
make the analogy to traditional republican democracy even more precise. For years,
corporations, stockholders, and the SEC have struggled over the proper role of socalled stockholder "proposals." Many of these proposals have had an eccentric quality,
and even those proposed by institutional investors have sometimes seemed more indicative of frustration than of a real desire for meaningful reform. The need for such
proposals to continue as an outlet for stockholder "voice" is dampened if a genuinely
fair process for electing directors becomes the norm.
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and state governments and the Exchanges, who each act on the basis
of input from various interested constituencies. Policymakers at the
state level must listen in this process, as well as speak. For example, it
can be argued fairly that Delaware's common law did not react quickly
or aggressively enough to changes in compensation practices during
the last two decades, changes that were so substantial quantitatively
that they required a qualitatively more intense form ofjudicial review,
through, for example, a reinvigorated application of the concept of
waste. In the past, the Delaware courts had generally taken a handsoff approach to executive compensation based on the assumption that
this was a matter of business judgment, which could also be factored
into the electorate's voting decisions. Before the last twenty years, the
overall level of executive compensation did not seem to reflect any
major defect in this policy choice. Empirical evidence of the huge
Argentina-like inflation in executive
compensation in more recent
17
doubt.'
greater
creates
decades
It will not surprise legal scholars that Delaware's common law was
perhaps slower than ideal in adapting to the new realities, which seem
to many to cry out for a deeper and more skeptical judicial inquiry.
The common law accretes knowledge, but not always at an optimal
pace. The 2002 Reforms contain measures reflecting a policy judgment that the constraints of state law on executive compensation are,
in themselves, inadequate to protect investors against abusive compensation practices. State law policymakers-including judges shaping the common law-will undoubtedly be responsive to this expression of concern and may use it as an opportunity to reflect more
deeply on whether their own policies need adaptation to better protect stockholders.
In that process, a familiar policy question might arise: is it preferable to react to a potential need for greater restraints on executive
compensation by tightening judicial review, or by increasing the ability of stockholders to displace directors who do not set responsible
levels of pay? A potent electoral check on director conduct dampens
the need for increased judicial intervention and encourages the resolution of corporate disputes within the corporate family.
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Cf Jerry Useem, The Winner-Steal-All Society, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 21, 2002, at 13

("The statistics are simply too obscene: In 1999, the average chief executive earned
419 times more than his or her coworkers, up from 25 times in 1981, while the 10
highest-paid executives have seen their income soar an astonishing 4300 percent between 1981 and 2000.").
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VI. WITH A REDUCTION IN OFFICER-DIRECTORS FROM THE 2002
REFORMS, THE DELAWARE COURTS MAY NEED NEW TOOLS
TO HOLD KEY OFFICERS ACCOUNTABLE

One likely consequence of the 2002 Reforms is a further diminution in the already shrinking ranks of management directors who
serve on the boards of public companies."8 Given the unmistakable
message that independent directors are preferred, it will become increasingly unlikely that even the three managers most critical to governing a firm on a day-to-day basis will be on the board." 9 But it is
doubtful that this overall decline in board service by top managers will
correspond with any genuine reduction in the importance of key executives to the management of public companies.
For Delaware, the trend toward boards comprised entirely of independent directors (with the exception of the CEO) has a subtle
consequence. Many of our fiduciary duty cases involve claims of selfdealing against top managers who also happen to be directors. Under
Delaware law, officers, as well as directors, owe fiduciary duties to the
firm. As a practical matter, however, most of our case law has focused
on the fiduciary duties of corporate directors because boards have
tended to include those key executives in a position to extract private
rents from the firm at the expense of the stockholders. Our law has
made it clear, moreover, that a director who exploits the company in
his capacity as an officer or an employee is subject to the same strictures as if his wrongdoing occurred in the boardroom. That is, there
is no safe harbor for a director to argue that his malfeasance was
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See Bhagat & Black, supra note 28, at 921 (1999) (noting the trend in the de-

cline of management directors).
19 Notwithstanding the widespread pro-independent
director drum beat, there is
some empirical evidence that suggests that the proportion of independent directors on
a board is inversely correlated to firm performance. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard
Black, The Non-CorrelationBetween Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance,27
J. CORP. L. 231, 263 (2002) ("We find a reasonably strong inverse correlation between
firm performance in the recent past and board independence. However, there is no
evidence that greater board independence leads to improved firm performance ....
[These results] do not support the conventional wisdom favoring the monitoring
board, with a high degree of board independence." (emphasis added)); see also Bhagat
& Black, supra note 28, at 944-49 (finding evidence that suggests "a possible negative
correlation between supermajority-independent boards and firm performance" and
suggesting "that it may be valuable for boards to include at least a moderate number of
inside directors"). We do not enter this debate, but do note our belief that the 2002
Reforms will likely result in a reduction of inside participation and deepen the trend
toward a model involving the CEO as the only inside director.
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committed
in his capacity as an officer or employee, rather than as a
20
director.
A practical problem exists, however, for Delaware's ability to hold
key officers accountable for a breach of fiduciary duty when they are
not also members of the board of directors. That difficulty is the
court's ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over the officer, whose
allegedly wrongful actions against the corporation will, in most instances, have occurred outside Delaware. Absent some act within
Delaware itself that can be charged to the officer,
our general "long12 1
arm" service of process statute is insufficient.
What is lacking in Delaware law is a key executive counterpart to
2
our director service statute. After Shaffer v. Heitner,1
2 our state
adopted title 10, section 3114 of the Delaware Code, which states that
every person who accepts a directorship of a Delaware corporation
consents to service of process in Delaware for purposes of defending
an action brought against him in his official corporate capacity. In
the past year, several of the most prominent of the corporate scandals
have involved (apparently) serious breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate officers and executives who were not directors. 23 Given that
the 2002 Reforms will increase the trend toward fewer management
directors, it would make sense for Delaware to adopt a new subsection
of section 3114 designed to cover top executives. This provision could
be modeled on section 3114 and simply state that top executives of
Delaware companies consent to service of process in Delaware for
claims brought
against them in their official capacities as an officer or
124
employee.
120 See, e.g., Hoover Indus., Inc. v. Chase, No. 9276,
1988 WL 73758, at *2 (Del. Ch.
July 13, 1988) (rejecting management director defendant's argument that his actions
were taken in his capacity as an officer and not a director and therefore section
3114(a) did not authorize service of process).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104 (2001) (generally requiring an
act within
Delaware or an effect within Delaware as a geographic fact, rather than as a matter of
metaphysical theory, in the absence of a continuing presence by the defendant in
Delaware); HMG/Courtland Props. v. Gray, 729 A.2d 300, 306 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that section 3104 "provides a basis for serving non-resident defendants who
'through an agent' engage in specified forum-directed activities").
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
123 E.g., Enron.
124 Simultaneously, section 3114 should be amended
to make clear that a director
consents to service of process for any claim brought against him involving a breach of
duty against the company, whether as a director, officer, employee, or in a comparable
position at a controlled subsidiary. Although our courts have generally rejected
"Three Faces Of Eve" defenses by fiduciary defendants, e.g., Grace Brothers v. Uniholding
Corp., No. 17612, 2000 WL 982401 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2000), statutory clarity would
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This change would not increase the standard of liability that now
applies to corporate officers and employees. But it would increase the
ability of stockholder-plaintiffs to hold these key corporate decisionmakers accountable for failing to comply with their fiduciary duties. 25
It remains the case that the stockholders of Delaware companies are
widely dispersed and that the effects on them of breaches of duty
track their locations, not that of the company's headquarters. The
corporate contract-the certificate of incorporation-that selects a
state of incorporation reflects a choice to have Delaware law govern
the internal relations of the firm. This should include a promise by
Delaware to make its courts available as a forum for the resolution of
fiduciary duty claims against top executives who have voluntarily cho116
sen to accept a position of trust in a Delaware corporation.
To bolster this modest reform, section 3114 could also be amended to clarify that any person who aids and abets a breach of fiduciary duty against a Delaware corporation is subject to jurisdiction in
Delaware so long as Delaware's exercise of jurisdiction is consistent
with federal constitutional standards of due process. Again, the reality
is that the injury to a Delaware corporation and its stockholders does
not track the company's headquarters. In order to be found liable for
aiding and abetting, a defendant must have consciously assisted a
breach of fiduciary duty. So long as the Delaware courts are satisfied
that the fundamental fairness concerns of the federal due process test
are satisfied, they should not have to trifle with the application of a
long-arm statute designed for other purposes (namely, tort and contract cases).

reduce needless litigation expense and send a clearer policy message about the seriousness with which we regard fiduciary compliance.
125 This proposal was inspired in part by a provocative and incisive article written
by Professors Thompson and Sale and by extensive discussion with Professor Thompson. See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraudas Corporate Governance:
Reflections Upon Federalism,56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 868-72 (2002) (noting that Delaware's
intense focus on director accountability is inadequate to address the important issue of
officer misconduct and has ceded core state law concerns to the federal government,
which regulates officer conduct through disclosure regulation, some aspects of which
have the intended effect of encouraging care and loyalty by officers).
126 Undoubtedly, questions of scope will arise. These
can be resolved by conservatism in the first instance, by focusing on chief executive officers, presidents, chief
operating officers, chief financial officers, chief technology officers, treasurers, general
counsel, controllers, secretaries, and executive vice presidents. The SEC also has
regulations under the Exchange Act that define key executives for certain purposes
which could serve as a starting point for Delaware. See, for example, Exchange Act
Rule 3b-7 (defining "executive officer"), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-7 (2003), and Rule 16a-1
(defining "officer"), id. § 240.16a-1.
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VII. CONCLUSION

This is a challenging and interesting time for policymakers involved in shaping the American corporate governance system. Like
many ambitious policy initiatives, the 2002 Reforms have a destabilizing character, which, as we have shown, calls into question the relationship among the federal government, the Stock Exchanges, and
the states in shaping our overall system of corporate law. In this Article, we have identified some aspects of the 2002 Reforms that generate
creative friction with state corporate law and its regulatory domain. In
our view, however, the destabilizing effects of the Reforms should not
be greeted by state policymakers with despair. Instead, they should be
welcomed as an invitation for the states to join as full partners in the
creative process of reform.
By doing their part to ensure that the 2002 Reforms are sensibly
implemented and that state law complements to the Reforms are considered, the states will maximize the likelihood that the Reforms can
increase the integrity of corporate America without undue cost. By
considering additional initiatives of their own and by showing that the
states take corporate responsibility seriously, state policymakers will
shape a political environment in which modest adjustments to the
2002 Reforms can be more feasibly accomplished, when necessary, in
the best interests of investors in public companies.
This does not, of course, mean that state policymakers should
yield supinely to whatever measures are proposed by the federal government and the Stock Exchanges. Rather, it means that the states
must be full and active participants in the ongoing dialogue about
improving our system of corporate law. To the extent that states play
this role and serve as a source of creative and responsible reform
themselves when action is warranted, the traditional division of responsibility that has, on balance, served investors and the general public well to date should remain largely intact.
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